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xii The new learning marketIntroduction
In summer 1999, shortly after the publication of the White Paper
Learning to succeed, FEDA and IPPR agreed to carry out a programme
of joint work to analyse the proposals and to consider options for the
operation of the new sector. The starting point for the work undertaken
was broad support for the Government’s aims in introducing these major
reforms to post-16 learning, and a concern to assist in shaping these 
to ensure success. Details of the IPPR–FEDA team and of seminar
participants can be found on pp xi–xii.
The analysis focused particularly on the concept of the ‘market’
being proposed in the White Paper as central to success in meeting 
the following stated objectives:
  Change should promote excellence and participation
  Employers should have a substantial stake in shaping 
post-16 education and training
  Systems must be learner driven and responsive to the 
needs of individuals, businesses and their communities
  Equal access to education, training and 
skills opportunities should be a priority
  People should have access to support in the form of good advice 
and guidance and, where appropriate, ﬁnancial help
  Accountability, efﬁciency and probity should 
be promoted at every level. 
This paper provides an overview of the emerging issues, themes 
and areas of consensus emerging from three seminars held to consider
the operation and organisation of the new learning market. Different
positions were taken in discussion, so this paper does not necessarily
represent the views of all seminar participants. This overview does 
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1not reproduce the detailed argument and evidence presented in the
accompanying papers. Its purpose is to draw from the discussion of
those papers the key areas of consensus and controversy, and issues
where it is felt that further thinking is required. Given that the context
and proposals for the Learning and Skills Council are developing rapidly,
the overview also draws on recent papers published since the seminars
were held. This paper is structured around three broad themes:
  The balance between planning and the market
  Workforce development and meeting the needs of employers
  Institutional arrangements.
The ﬁnal section sets out recommendations about the operation 
of the new learning market to be considered by those charged 
with the implementation of the Government’s proposals. 
The balance between planning and the market
Customer-driven or planning driven?
A key issue to be considered is the extent to which the arrangements
should aim to empower customers to secure a responsive market, and
the extent to which they should provide the Government and its agencies
with mechanisms to plan provision to meet need.1 These are two very
different policy options and the White Paper and the Learning and
Skills Council prospectus give conﬂicting signals. 
The White Paper uses the language of the marketplace in its commit-
ment to establishing a ‘fair and competitive market’, and emphasises
the need for responsiveness and a demand-led, customer-led service.
This approach suggests that customers will be empowered to demand
responsive services within a competitive marketplace. 
But it also appears that the Government envisages a strong planning
model particularly through the operation of the 47 local Learning and
Skills Councils which will have responsibility, for example, for:
  Identifying the current and future learning and skills priorities 
for individuals, businesses and communities
  Discussing and agreeing the plans and budgets 
for individual colleges and training providers
  Developing a local provider infrastructure and 
managing the learning market.
The Learning and Skills Council prospectus 
2 The new learning market 
1. This issue is addressed particularly in the two papers by Peter Robinson (chapters 2 and 6).The Learning and Skills Council prospectus also makes it clear that
mechanisms to predict and specify skills needs will be a major feature
of the new arrangements at national, regional and local levels.
Therefore there is a tension in the proposals regarding the extent 
to which we are looking at normal market activity based on action 
by customers in a demand-led system, or at a planning model which
analyses need and secures provision to meet it.
What has been the failure? 
New proposals need to be understood in the context of the failures 
of the existing system, in order that we understand the problem 
that is being solved.
Seminar participants identiﬁed a range of areas where it was felt
that the Government perceives failures. These were not shared by 
all participants, but included the following concerns: poor quality
provision, uncertain value for money, lack of – and hostility towards –
new entrants to the supply-side, lack of responsiveness, perceived
failures in respect of widening participation and social inclusion,
administrative complexity, inefﬁciency and inconsistency. On balance,
however, the main criticism of the current system which runs through
Learning to succeed is that the system has failed to supply employers
and the economy with a workforce with the skills they require.2
Proposals appear to pay most attention to this speciﬁc failure. 
This failure could be a result of providers not making available the
right education and training programmes, or of customers ‘failing’ 
to opt for these, or some combination of these.
Provider failure?
The extent to which providers are responsive to customers is clearly
variable. Providers argue that they do respond to the needs of customers,
whether employers or individuals, but they can only do so in as far as 
it is economic for them to do so. High costs of some types of provision
and the inefﬁciencies of making provision for small groups of learners
constrain the capacity of providers to be responsive. The negative
impact of some aspects of the funding systems and of performance
indicators on providers’ capacity to be responsive are well rehearsed.3
College performance in relation to local economic development is 
also acknowledged to be improving, but variable.
Overview 3
2. This point is developed in the paper by Andy Westwood (chapter 7).
3. Adrian Perry’s paper (chapter 5) explores the issues around performance indicators in depth.A particular brake on responsiveness results from constraints on 
what can be provided at public expense. In order to measure use of
public funds, measurable outcomes such as qualiﬁcations are used as 
a proxy for measuring learning.4Therefore publicly funded provision
must lead to a qualiﬁcation. Providers cite this as a major constraint 
in that employers require speciﬁc skills and therefore their needs are
frequently not met by qualiﬁcations. As one employer put it: ‘SMEs don’t
want courses, they want expertise.’ The pressure to deliver qualiﬁcations
also inhibits providers’ capacity to work effectively with reluctant or
‘fragile’ learners who may need very speciﬁc skills and conﬁdence
building and are not prepared to risk failure. In these cases providers
are inhibited in their capacity to meet the needs of their customers. 
It can be argued therefore that government regulation of the product
being delivered in the learning market reduces the capacity of providers
to meet customer needs. The Learning and Skills Council should use 
its new powers to fund provision other than qualiﬁcations to ensure
that providers are able to meet customer needs more effectively. 
The capacity to fund units of qualiﬁcations for adults will assist
provider responsiveness.
Customer failure?
Another possible explanation of this perceived failure is that individual
customers are not demanding what employers, communities and the
economy want. Therefore it is argued that individual preference does
not lead to choices being made which are good for the economy. It might
equally be argued that individual employers, where they are driven by
short-term goals, do not always demand what is good for the economy.
As a result, it is argued, greater intervention through planning is required
to get a better ﬁt between the desires of individuals and the needs of the
economy. Learning to succeed and the Prospectus do not spell out how
this will be achieved in detail, but the elements appear to be:
  Systematic analysis of the skills required through consultation 
with employers and strengthening their capacity to identify and
articulate their needs, e.g. through NTOs. This element is given
signiﬁcant emphasis in Learning to succeed and the Prospectus
  Removal of barriers to participation, 
particularly by those most at risk of exclusion
  More information and advice to learners about 
the opportunities available, and
  Greater attention to promotion of learning to improve take-up.
4 The new learning market 
4. See Geoff Stanton’s paper (chapter 4) for exploration of this issue.The weight given to these different elements will be critical to the precise
arrangements. The ﬁrst element could point towards a controlled market,
where analysis of the skills in different sectors informs detailed planning
and determines what is funded and therefore what is on offer. The latter
elements point towards empowering learners and customers to make
informed demands – in other words to encourage the market to 
operate as a market. 
The IPPR–FEDA programme of work considered where the balance
should rest between a planning and a customer-driven model. The key
question to be addressed in reaching a view is whether evidence suggests
that customers/learners make sensible choices – i.e. do they choose educa-
tion and training that will lead to jobs and social inclusion; or do they
make poor decisions, leading to unemployment and social exclusion.
If the evidence is that customers – learners or employers purchasing
provision – make sensible decisions, then the logic is to support the
operation of a market: empower the inﬂuential customer, give them
good information on which to base decisions and let funding follow
demand. If, on the other hand, evidence suggests learners make poor
decisions, then the implication is that the Government should carry out
detailed planning of the provision, and by implication, ﬁt learners to
that provision.
There was clear consensus that information is needed for learners
which is accurate and comprehensive – any customer will make better
decisions if they have adequate information about options. Detailed
information on rates of return should be part of the information provided
so that customers are better able to take informed decisions. The seminars
also recognised that there is a major challenge in generating demand
among learners who are not participating, both through removing
ﬁnancial and other barriers, and through raising motivation.
In general though, it was felt that learners do make sensible decisions
in their own terms, are resistant to being directed away from their natural
inclinations and do read the labour market signals effectively where these
are clear. A range of examples are suggested of where learner choice is
at fault: there are shortages of speciﬁc IT skills; there is lack of demand
for plumbing courses; it is suggested that too many people want to do
hairdressing and media studies. However, there is little evidence of
unemployed hairdressers or media studies graduates – on the contrary,
hairdressing is an established route to ﬁnancial independence for women
with family commitments, and media studies appear to provide generic
skills in demand in the labour market.
Where skills shortages exist, however, they may generate wage
pressure and present a barrier to the smooth running of the economy.
Overview 5The seminar’s view was that this should be addressed primarily through
initiatives to inform learner choice, and not through offering learners
prescribed or constrained choices. Overwhelmingly the seminars came
to a view that the focus in implementing the Learning and Skills proposals
should be on supporting the learner to be an informed and inﬂuential
customer and on ensuring the system has the capacity to deliver the
outcomes that learners require. 
Where is intervention necessary?
The seminars considered areas where government intervention is required.
Although there is caution among education professionals about the
application of economic terminology to education, an effective market
is simply about responding to the needs of individuals and customers.
Therefore, the Government’s responsibility should be to intervene
where the market will not work effectively. Primarily this is likely 
to require speciﬁc measures for: 
  Ensuring comprehensive provision in all areas, particularly of
provision which is costly to provide – engineering, construction, 
etc. – and ensuring efﬁciency through rationalisation of provision 
  Ensuring the availability of accurate information for customers
  Securing equity of access to the provision for all learners – free markets
driven by proﬁt motives do not deliver social justice, it was argued.
The Government must intervene to achieve its social responsibilities
  Taking a long-term view of the needs of society and the economy. 
The latter point is critical: the key customers of the Learning and Skills
Council – individuals, communities and employers – will not be in a
position to take a comprehensive and long-term view of society’s political,
economic and social needs. This remains the responsibility of
Government and a necessary area for intervention. 
It was also acknowledged that the Government may take a policy
view that Britain suffers from a ‘low skills equilibrium’ and needs to 
be re-positioned as a high skill economy. Although the seminar did not
accept the low skills equilibrium as a reality, it was accepted that govern-
ment intervention to re-position the economy would be legitimate. 
Learners as inﬂuential customers
Customers of education and training, including both employers 
and individuals, do not always behave as inﬂuential consumers and 
are not always treated as such. Provider responsiveness and customer
empowerment both need improvement. The Learning and Skills Council
prospectus makes welcome proposals to bring customer feedback more
6 The new learning market strongly into the new framework. Customer feedback and satisfaction
should become major drivers in the new system.
The inﬂuential customer is essential in raising the quality of provision
in any sector of the market. In a service as vital as education, a typical
customer response of choosing not to consume a product is not an
acceptable solution. Intervention is needed to ensure that customers
can engage and that the system is responsive to their needs.
It was also noted that in the learning market, learners/consumers
lack an effective market sanction against poor quality providers. For
example, learners do not get their money back or a credit note if they
fail a qualiﬁcation or are dissatisﬁed with the quality of the course.
Individual Learning Accounts (ILAs) may change this situation, and
more systematic arrangements for learner feedback could provide 
the basis for direct customer recompense for poor quality.
It was also argued that implementation of the Learning to succeed
proposals needs to address the matter of how to engage learners actively
in the learning community in ways that establish them as stakeholders.5
Their capacity to manage and control their own learning is critical and
needs to be built into the design of the system. Discussion centred around
whether learners should view themselves as members of the institutions,
or of local Learning Partnerships, rather than simply as customers.
Workforce development and 
meeting the needs of employers
The apparent failure of the education and training system to supply the
skills needed by employers appears, as discussed earlier, to be the major
focus of the Learning to succeed proposals. The Government is clear
that national economic prosperity must underpin social reform and
modernisation of public services, and has stated clearly that employment
is the best route out of social exclusion. The Government’s capacity 
to improve the operation of the economy is therefore paramount to
achieving its policies, and Learning to succeed and the Learning and
Skills Council prospectus therefore place great importance on ensuring
that the needs of business are clearly articulated and inform the
planning process. 
Identifying the skill needs of small and medium employers
The Learning and Skills Council prospectus establishes detailed
mechanisms for drawing together advice on ‘skills supply and demand’
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5. Mick Fletcher’s paper (chapter 3) explores this aspect in detail.at national, regional and local levels. Although the Prospectus does 
not use the term ‘Labour Market Information’ (LMI), the proposals
raise concerns that the Government may be contemplating a detailed
workforce planning approach. There is widespread scepticism about
the value of LMI among providers and a view that ‘LMI doesn’t help
plan a pattern of provision’.
The seminar questioned the way that employer needs can be articu-
lated. A distinction was made in particular between the needs of very
large employers and the needs of Small and Medium Employers (SMEs)
which form the majority of businesses. While large employers are able
to commit employee time to local, national or regional public work on
committees and to working with their National Training Organisations
for example, this is much more difﬁcult for SMEs. It was argued that
SMEs do not have the capacity to have representatives sitting on planning
bodies, so their voices will not be heard through these channels.
The phrase ‘SMEs don’t use directories’ encapsulated the 
problems. There is not a clear set of skill or support needs which, 
if only the SME were better organised, could be expressed and then
catered for. An organic, interactive model involving discussion about
identifying and meeting needs is required through a dialogue between
the customer and the provider in a normal supply-chain relationship.
Education is part of an employer’s supply chain. The compilation 
of accurate information through a planning cycle does not ﬁt the
experience of SMEs. They have to be able to respond to rapidly
changing circumstances within very tight parameters. 
This view therefore challenged the capacity of a careful annual
planning cycle to meet the needs of small and medium employers. 
The operation of the new Learning and Skills sector must not rely unduly
on annual planning systems, but must facilitate local customer–provider
dialogue to identify and address immediate needs. 
The view that employers have not had an adequate voice or inﬂuence
on arrangements was also challenged – they accounted for at least half
of college governing bodies until changes introduced in September 1999
reduced them to a third, and they have played a major role in TECs. This
suggests that engaging employers simply through representation is not
enough. Therefore, an approach which simply attempts to put employers
in charge is unlikely to be successful. More thought is needed about how
to engage employers as effective and inﬂuential customers. Part of the
approach should be through strategies to elicit demand from employers
and assist them in articulating it; this was considered a major issue. 
On the other hand, it was argued that although speciﬁc technical
and practical skills are still the most important, the ‘soft’ skills of
8 The new learning market working in teams, handling customers and turning up ‘dressed for work’
are increasingly sought. It was argued that there is signiﬁcant consistency
among employers about the nature of these generic skills.
However, neither these soft skills nor the speciﬁc technical and
practical skills ﬁt comfortably with existing qualiﬁcations. While
employers are concerned to develop a capable workforce, the pressure
on institutions is to deliver qualiﬁcations – outcomes that are readily
amenable to measurement demonstrating good use of public funding
to the Treasury. Thus there is a tension between the demands of
accountability and the needs of employers.
Who pays?
Discussion about skills gaps raises important issues about what 
should be funded by Government and what should be funded by
individuals and by employers. The Learning and Skills Bill states
clearly that ‘the Council must … encourage employers to contribute 
to the costs of post-16 education and training’. 
The respective responsibilities of Government, employers and 
individuals to fund education and training are unclear and have
hampered effective relationships between employers and education
providers. The third report of the National Skills Task Force6 makes
proposals for public funding up to level 2 for adults, but does not 
reach a view about a statutory framework for employer contributions
to training. It is vital that the Learning and Skills Council should clarify
the position. A split of responsibilities should be developed along 
the following lines:
  Employers pay for training of staff in job-speciﬁc skills
  Public funding pays for key transferable skills and subsidises
according to social or future skills priorities
  Individuals contribute where their longer-term career prospects 
are enhanced: for example, individuals might fund qualiﬁcations
since these were more likely to be of beneﬁt to the individual 
than to the employer.
Institutional arrangements
Supply-side reforms to create a demand-led system?
While the objective of the White Paper is to create a demand-led system,
the reforms primarily address the supply-side. These will not necessarily
generate the new demand needed to meet the objectives of the new system.
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6. Tackling the adult skills gap: upskilling adults and the role of workplace learning. DfEE, 2000.Discussion at the seminars suggested that the aim of the reforms in the
short term is to sort out the supply-side by addressing issues of quality,
standards, accountability, purpose/focus, etc. This will provide the basis
for a move, in the Government’s next term of ofﬁce, to a major promotion
on the demand-side. The proposals therefore aim to ensure that providers
are ﬁt to deliver in a future system with the empowered, informed, 
self-ﬁnanced learner at the centre. 
This scenario therefore saw these reforms as an attempt to sort 
out the supply-side as a prelude to addressing the demand-side.
Another perspective is that the proposals provide the basis for estab-
lishing mechanisms that can more clearly transmit policy decisions. 
Therefore the proposals aim to create a structure for more rapid
government intervention, either systematically through planning
mechanisms or intermittently through powers to address failure. 
Roles in the new arrangements
There was considerable discussion about the roles and responsibilities
of the many agencies likely to be involved in the implementation of the
Learning and Skills sector. The respective roles of the local Learning and
Skills Councils and the local Learning Partnerships were not understood
by contributors. There was a concern that the new arrangements create
additional layers, and that the added value from local LSCs needs to be
identiﬁed. The respective roles and responsibilities of local Learning
Partnerships and Learning and Skills Councils for adult guidance are not
clear. A potential conﬂict of interest was identiﬁed in the allocation of
responsibilities for guidance to LSCs who also had responsibility for hitting
government targets. This could prejudice the impartiality of advice.
A need was seen for clear coordination between local LSCs and the
Small Business Service (SBS), the view being expressed that it might have
been better to combine them. Many of the measures needed to support
employers in identifying and articulating their needs would fall more
naturally to the SBS, while work to strengthen collaboration between
providers might better be handled via Lifelong Learning Partnerships.
This again raised the question of whether there was any real need for
local Learning and Skills Councils.
However, a view began to emerge of the appropriate role of the
local Learning and Skills Councils in carrying through, at local level,
those government interventions that are needed to make the market
operate effectively, namely by:
  Ensuring comprehensive provision in all areas, particularly of
provision which is costly to provide, and by ensuring efﬁciency 
through rationalisation of provision 
10 The new learning market   Ensuring the availability of accurate information for customers
  Securing equity of access to the provision
  Taking a long-term view of the needs of society and the economy.
It was felt that these might be best operationalised at a local level 
and that they should provide the focus for the work of the local
Learning and Skills Councils. However, there was no support for 
the local Learning and Skills Councils being given a role in the 
detailed numerical planning of places. Individual learner choice 
should be the basis for making provision.
The role of national targets
The importance of national targets was questioned, with some 
participants seeing the whole notion as inconsistent with the concept
of a learning market. While targets as an expression of a national aspira-
tion or ambition could have a symbolic role, there was concern that they
might become key drivers of detailed planning decisions.
There was also concern that targets reinforced the preoccupation
with what was measurable rather than what mattered. This aspect 
of a ‘command and control’ culture was seen by some to explain the
preoccupation of funding agencies with qualiﬁcations when many
employers and individuals found them to be of secondary importance. 
The view was expressed that targets have in any event outlived their
usefulness. All the important increases in participation in recent years
have preceded the establishment of national targets.
Provider stability
An implication of establishing a ‘fair and competitive market’
(Learning to succeed) could be that providers fail or go bankrupt.
While this is accepted among private training providers, it is not
among public sector institutions. However, this could be a logical
consequence of taking the market seriously. This raises questions 
about the role of a public sector and whether colleges are seen to have
a particular strategic role within new arrangements. One approach
would be for colleges to be developed as the ‘built to last’7 providers
offering a network of high quality and dedicated centres, professional
support and stability within a more diverse market. Alternatively, 
in a wider market with a larger provider base, failures could be more
readily tolerated as they would not threaten adequacy of provision. 
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7. This idea is explored in Work in the knowledge-driven economy. DTI, 1999.Recommendations
The key question that has emerged from consideration of the operation
and organisation of the new learning market is where the balance should
rest between a market-driven or planning-driven approach – what should
be driven by customer demand, and where is intervention required?
The answer lies essentially in an assessment of whether customers 
are able to make appropriate decisions, or whether responsiveness to
learner demand will be detrimental to the prospects of the individual
and the economy. Consideration of these issues led to agreement at 
the seminars that informed customer choice is a sound basis for a
learning market to operate, and scepticism about the capacity of 
a ‘command and control’ planning approach to deliver an efﬁcient
system. As a result the following recommendations are offered:
  The focus in implementing the Learning and Skills proposals 
should be on supporting the learner to be an informed and
inﬂuential customer and on ensuring the system has the 
capacity to deliver the outcomes that learners require. 
  The Learning and Skills Council should use its new powers 
to fund provision other than qualiﬁcations to ensure that 
providers are able to meet customer needs more effectively.
  Customer feedback and satisfaction should become 
major drivers in the new system.
  An effective market responds to the needs of individuals and
customers. Government’s responsibility should be to intervene 
only where the market will not deliver its objectives. Primarily 
this is likely to require speciﬁc measures for:
    Ensuring comprehensive provision in all areas, particularly 
of provision which is costly to provide, and ensuring 
efﬁciency through rationalisation of provision
    Ensuring the availability of accurate information for customers
    Securing equity of access to the provision
    Taking a long-term view of the needs of society and the economy.
The key role of the local Learning and Skills Councils should be to
focus on the above functions at local area level.
  The respective roles and responsibilities of local Learning Partnerships
and Learning and Skills Councils for adult information and guidance
are not clear. A potential conﬂict of interest was identiﬁed in the
allocation of responsibilities for guidance to LSCs who also had
responsibility for hitting government targets. This could prejudice
the impartiality of advice.
12 The new learning market   The operation of the new Learning and Skills sector must not 
rely unduly on annual planning systems, but must facilitate local
customer–provider dialogue to identify and address immediate needs.
The seminar series has explored how best to achieve the Government’s
aims for the operation of the new Learning and Skills system. 
This commentary and its recommendations are commended 
for wider discussion and to support the work of those charged 
with constructing the new post-16 education and training framework.
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14 The new learning market T
he Government’s framework for post-16 learning 
(outside of higher education) has been set out in the 
White Paper Learning to succeed (DfEE, 1999a) and
subsequent documents (DfEE, 1999b and 1999c). 
This discussion paper explores the possible contrasts 
between two of the principles set out by the DfEE, that:
  The system must be learner driven and responsive to 
the needs of individuals, businesses and their communities
  The system must respond to the strategic needs of the economy 
and national, regional and local skills agendas.
The ﬁrst principle appears to signal clearly the desire to have a 
learning market driven by the needs of the learner, while the second
principle appears to indicate that this market will be overlaid by a
planning apparatus. The learning market will be further developed
through common national funding tariffs. At the same time the
National Learning and Skills Council will, from 2001, take
responsibility for delivering the National Learning Targets, and 
local Learning and Skills Councils will have some discretionary
funding to support local priorities and be able to vary locally 
the funding tariffs. Both the national and local bodies will have 
a signiﬁcant employer presence. Does the learning market really 
need to be supplemented by this apparent attempt at planning?
Now of course all markets are in practice subject to some form 
of regulation and sometimes other forms of intervention, so that the
pure market model exists nowhere outside of economics textbooks.
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on the new learning market, 26 October 1999.However, few markets in western economies are overlaid with a planning
apparatus. Why should further education and training require planning
and what form should that planning take? To answer this question we
need to explore the arguments which are put forward to suggest that
further education and training suffers from signiﬁcant market failures. 
In looking at this issue, the paper sets out to explore three 
broad questions:
  What are the requirements for a learning market to function effectively?
  What gaps might be left by the learning market? 
  What institutional arrangements would be suggested by an analysis
of how a learning market should work and the gaps it might leave? 
A distinction is often made between a ‘demand led’ system and a
‘needs led’ system, where the latter stresses the requirement to create
demand rather than just respond to it. In this model one role of ‘planning’
bodies would be to stimulate demand for courses and qualiﬁcations which
are seen to be in the national, regional or local‘strategic’ interest and
which the learning market on its own would not deliver. Additionally,
or alternatively, a role of such bodies would be to stimulate demand from
individuals or groups in the population currently under-represented in
further education and training. These two roles are clearly distinct.
One can have a body with a remit to reduce the barriers to learning 
for under-represented groups, but with those people choosing their
own courses unconstrained by attempts to plan provision to meet
‘strategic skill needs’.
The main criticism of the learning market being offered by those
who see a much greater role for ‘strategic’ planning is that some of 
the choices made by individuals to do various courses appear not to
match the requirements of businesses. It is alleged that many courses
are taken which appear to have limited relevance to the ‘needs’ of the
national or local labour market, while the strategic needs of employers
are being neglected. Too many people do courses in media studies and
hairdressing, while what industry really needs are engineers and IT
professionals. The learning market does not appear to be matching
supply and demand effectively.
The second key part of the argument must be that planning bodies
could do a better job of matching supply and demand than the market
and thereby overcome the mismatches which are held to exist. Only by
intervening to promote and plan lifelong learning, rather than leaving
it to the market, will the optimal level of investment in education and
training be secured.
What are the conditions for a functioning learning market to exist?
16 The new learning marketFirstly, individuals need access to adequate information and guidance,
and secondly an appropriate degree of competition between providers
is necessary, to make informed choice a reality. In addition if individuals
find it hard to borrow from private capital markets to ﬁnance their
learning, there needs to be a funding mechanism which will either
provide courses free or heavily subsidised, and/or provide ‘soft’ loan
facilities. The State plays a further regulatory function in ensuring that
institutions offering education and training meet certain quality standards.
If these four conditions are satisﬁed then a learning market should
work reasonably well, and arguably without the need for national,
regional and local ‘planning’ bodies.
To illustrate further what is meant by a well-functioning market we
could consider the market for a commodity which is even more important
than lifelong learning: food (see also Barr, 1998). The example of food
has been picked because it is sometimes alleged that post-compulsory
learning is too important to be left to the market. But food is even more
important and, with important provisos, we do leave more scope for the
market to operate. The State’s main function in ensuring adequate
nutrition of the body rather than the mind is ﬁrstly, to make sure
through the tax and beneﬁts system that everyone has sufﬁcient income
to sustain a reasonable diet (although the poverty statistics may suggest
some government failure here). In addition it regulates to ensure food
quality (again not always successfully), and to make sure consumers
have enough information to make choices, and to promote adequate
competition between food retailers.
Once these conditions are satisﬁed, things are left up to the market.
Consumers of food do not come together to coordinate their purchases;
providers of food do not coordinate the supply side of the market (and
might run foul of the competition authorities if they tried to). There are
(outside of wartime) no regional food development agencies or local food
councils to supplement the market with a planning apparatus designed
to achieve a better balance between the supply and demand of different
foodstuffs than would be achieved by the market alone.
The question is whether the learning market is signiﬁcantly different
from the market for food to suggest a different approach which places
less emphasis on the market mechanism? (n.b. the arguments which
follow relate to post-compulsory learning; a different set of arguments
relate to schools.)
One market failure widely regarded as a legitimate concern is the
problem that some individuals may not be able to access easily and
cost-effectively the information which would allow them to make
rational choices. Most countries provide information and advice
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employment service, seeing information as a public good. So for the
learning market to work the ﬁrst condition is that the learner must have
enough good quality information to make informed choices. This means
that the labour market must send out fairly clear signals to individuals
about the qualiﬁcations which are going to receive decent ﬁnancial
rewards. Individuals must respond to these signals and planning 
bodies must not be able to read the signals signiﬁcantly better.
It is therefore fairly straightforward to test the hypothesis that the
learning market is failing. Using systematic research which looks at 
the returns to qualiﬁcations, do we observe individuals by and large
taking rational decisions in relation to lifelong learning opportunities?
Or do the planning bodies and the other institutions from which the
planning bodies draw their members appear to have a better grasp 
of what is really going on?
One concern in the UK policy debate is that whereas the returns 
to HE qualiﬁcations are well researched and appear to be pretty
unambiguous, the returns to FE qualiﬁcations for some individuals
could be less clear cut and there is evidence that this does concern
some people undertaking FE courses (Callender, 1999).
Given the better research on returns to HE qualiﬁcations, it is worth
looking at some of these results before looking speciﬁcally at further
education. The allegation aimed at higher education is that too many
people take courses like media studies and not enough do science and
engineering. This is held to be both irrational from the point of view 
of the individual and certainly irrational from the point of view of the
economy. Blundell et al. (1997) used the 1958 National Child Devel-
opment Study to look at the returns to different HE qualiﬁcations,
controlling for a whole range of background factors which might 
also inﬂuence earnings. They found that for men, degrees in biology,
chemistry and geography delivered signiﬁcantly lower earnings than
other degrees. For women, degrees in education, economics, accountancy
and law paid off with signiﬁcantly higher earnings. For both genders,
degrees in maths or physics did not yield signiﬁcantly higher earnings
when compared with other degrees.
Many of these results run counter to most people’s intuition – 
but then that may be the problem. The planners’ views about what 
are the ‘right’ courses to fund more generously in the national or local 
‘strategic’ interest may be inﬂuenced as much by intuition (or prejudice?)
as any systematic evidence. The point is that if we see the proportion of
men taking biology and chemistry, or people as a whole taking maths
and physics, is not as high as ‘we’ would like it to be, this could be
18 The new learning marketconﬁrmation that individuals are reading the signals from the labour
market better than ‘we’ – the planners – are. And let us be clear about
what these signals are: employers are not paying people with science
degrees an earnings premium in the labour market. Yet it is the represen-
tatives of these same employers who play a major role in the planning
bodies which assert that the UK economy does not have enough science
graduates. This just goes to demonstrate the one iron law in this debate:
do not listen to what employers say, look at what they pay for.
This author is aware of no systematic evidence on the earnings 
of media studies graduates when compared with other graduates, 
so the claim that there are too many of them appears to lack any ﬁrm
empirical foundation. It may reﬂect anecdotal evidence or prejudice. In
the ‘knowledge based’ economy which is said to be evolving, the study
of Greek, Latin and classical literature and history may appear to have
no place. Yet the anecdotal evidence that classics graduates on a whole
do rather well in the labour market is at least as strong as the anecdotal
evidence that media studies graduates do not. This further illustrates the
point that broad conceptions about what the ‘needs’ of the economy are
may well not conform with what the labour market does actually reward.
Turning to further education, aside from the complaints about too
many hairdressers, it is frequently alleged that the UK economy suffers
from a general shortage of people with intermediate vocational quali-
ﬁcations. Indeed two key academic critics of the lack of planning in
further education to match the needs of economic development, 
when referring to ‘extensive’ evidence of a substantial mismatch
between student preferences and skill shortages as perceived by
employers, point to the problem of too many students opting for 
‘academic’ rather than ‘vocational’ programmes, as well as opting 
for inappropriate vocational options (Morgan and Rees, 1999).
Unfortunately for this argument, employers send out through the
labour market wholly unambiguous signals that academic qualiﬁcations
result in signiﬁcantly higher earnings than notionally equivalent vocational
qualiﬁcations (see Robinson, 1997a). Indeed, level 3 vocational quali-
ﬁcations yield earnings similar to those which could be expected by
someone holding ﬁve or more O-levels or higher grade GCSEs; 
while the earnings of people with A-levels match those of people 
who achieved level 3 and then level 4 vocational qualiﬁcations such 
as the HND (see also Blundell et al., 1997, who conﬁrm these ﬁndings).
Moreover, this lack of ‘parity of esteem’ between academic and vocational
routes appears to hold in other countries, including Germany.
So when we see a large majority of 16 year olds with high levels of
attainment at GCSE opting for the A-level route rather than, say, GNVQs,
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through the labour market. And those who criticise these patterns of
enrolment are the ones who appear to be behaving irrationally and
without regard to the evidence.
As for ‘inappropriate’ vocational options, two other authors have
expressed worries about the large numbers of graduates from nursery
nursing and GNVQ leisure and tourism courses (Felstead and Unwin,
1999). Given that the care occupations are the fastest expanding occu-
pations in the lower half of the labour market, the popularity of nursery
nursing courses does not seem misplaced. Moreover, the DfEE itself makes
great play of the statistic that 1·75 million people are employed in the
‘tourism-related’ industries. In fact, this statistic is rather misleading, as
the majority of those 1·75 million have relatively low paid jobs in bars,
cafés and hotels. The point is that in this case, the information coming
from those agencies wishing to ‘plan’ provision may be contributing 
to unwise course choices.
There is indeed plenty of evidence of ofﬁcial and quasi-ofﬁcial bodies
giving out biased and incorrect information about the returns to qualiﬁ-
cations or what the changing labour market requires – information
which in some cases amounts to propaganda. This problem arises
especially when bodies have been given conﬂicting remits. So if a
vocational qualiﬁcations council is set up so that its success is judged
by how many people take the vocational qualiﬁcations it is developing,
the same body cannot be expected to give impartial advice on the different
qualiﬁcation routes which are available to people, because that would
require giving out information on competing vocational qualiﬁcations.
The survival of a whole range of ‘other’ vocational qualiﬁcations
(‘other’ in this context means other than NVQs and GNVQs) and the
expansion of Open College Networks allowing colleges to provide
short courses in speciﬁc skills geared to local employers (noted by
Felstead and Unwin, 1999) is proof positive that the market works.
There is a demand for these courses from individuals and employers
and they have maintained some market share despite the indifference,
and, in the case of the ‘other’ vocational qualiﬁcations, at times
downright hostility, of the ‘planners’.
This discussion leads to one clear policy conclusion: the body or
bodies which provide information and guidance to learners must not
have their own axes to grind because they have been given other targets
as well, for example to achieve particular levels of qualiﬁcations in the
adult population. This raises serious doubts about the Government’s
plans to give the National Learning and Skills Council and the Local
Councils responsibility for the planning and funding of adult
20 The new learning marketinformation, advice and guidance services. They will be advising adult
learners at the same time as they will be responsible for meeting their
own targets and plans to achieve certain qualiﬁcation outcomes. How
can this not lead to the Councils giving information which is potentially
biased, advising people to take courses not because it is their own best
interest but because it will help the Councils meet their own targets?
There are legitimate concerns that young people in 11–18 schools do
not get enough information about the range of learning opportunities
which might be available in an area, and there is general concern about
the guidance available to adults. But in designing the right institutional
framework, conﬂicts of interest must be avoided. The primary purpose
of improving the ﬂow of information and guidance is to enable better
choices to be made by learners and other purchasers of education and
training – not to facilitate planning.
The second condition for a functioning learning market is an
appropriate degree of competition. Competition has a role to play in
putting pressure on institutions and departments within institutions
where successful completion rates may be low. Informed student choice
creates that pressure. A market failure which might affect local provision
of further education is the absence of a sufﬁcient number of education
and training institutions to offer learners an adequate degree of choice
within a travel-to-study area. This seems more likely to occur in small
towns and rural areas where there may be elements of local monopoly.
In such cases of local monopoly the answer is regulation: that is to say
an adequate quality assurance mechanism to make sure that courses
which are being offered are of a high standard, even in the absence 
of local alternatives.
A related market failure could arise if there are economies of scale
that make certain courses uneconomic to run without a larger pool of
learners than is locally available. The start-up costs for certain technical
courses for which there is a demand might also be prohibitive for local
providers. Across localities there may be different costs for providing
certain courses which have arisen for historical reasons. So there does
appear to be a role for a local ‘planning’ body that can offer modest
pump-priming funds to sustain or start courses that might otherwise
be uneconomic. There may occasionally be a role for pump-priming
funding to help new providers to set up, if the existence of a local
monopoly was felt to be inhibiting.
The main market failure as far as individuals are concerned could 
lie in the capital market. There is considerable evidence that individuals
in practice do ﬁnd it hard to borrow to ﬁnance lifelong learning, using
the ‘collateral’ of a higher stream of earnings in the future. This could
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some qualiﬁcations or difﬁculties in collecting the returns. In practice
all countries provide free or heavily subsidised initial post-compulsory
education and training, and offer some form of government backed
loans facility for some of the costs of higher education. The historical
paradox has been that these loans have been more easily available to
younger full-time students in higher education, where the returns to
qualiﬁcations are much easier to demonstrate, than to older and part-
time students and those in further education where the returns are less
clear. Here then is a clear ‘governmental’ failure, but putting it right
means looking at the public funding of students of different ages on
different qualiﬁcations routes, and is not solved by further ‘planning’.
Clearly there are some groups which have been under-represented in
further education and training and addressing these inequalities would
be a key role for any local agency. It may not be possible for individual
institutions to tackle those barriers – which result from lack of ﬁnancing,
child care, or adequate local transport – that diminish opportunities for
certain individuals. If we regard these barriers as ‘market failures’, then
they would all seem to stem from the problem of lack of income and
lack of opportunity to borrow. However, improving access to courses
does not imply having to plan what courses people are going to be
steered towards in order to meet local ‘strategic’ targets.
The other market failures which are frequently addressed in the
literature relate to ﬁrms themselves under-investing in training at the
workplace, rather than to the failure of the learning market as such.
The ﬁrst such possible market failure is that there are external beneﬁts
of education and training to the economy over and above the beneﬁts
to individuals or ﬁrms. For example, a highly trained workforce could
help ﬁrms to produce new technology or other innovations which can
then be exploited at no extra cost by other ﬁrms. This external beneﬁt
is not captured by the ﬁrm that does the training and the innovating,
and this will lead to lower levels of training than is optimal. However,
this argument is essentially the one that education and training generates
economic growth and there are signiﬁcant problems in demonstrating
this empirically in a convincing manner (see Robinson, 1997b and
Ashton and Green, 1995).
Another problem which might affect ﬁrms is poaching. If ﬁrms provide
training which leads to transferable skills, then this might make the
individuals who receive that training more attractive to other employers,
who might poach the trained workers. If ﬁrms fear such poaching they
will under-invest in training. However, if this is a problem, then the
evidence on the amount of training undertaken by British ﬁrms does
22 The new learning marketnot suggest that it is a problem which affects British ﬁrms more than
those in other countries (OECD, 1999). There is also evidence that
individuals who do receive employer provided training appear to be
marginally less likely to leave that employer (Dearden et al., 1997).
These market failures, if they are serious, would lead to arguments
for policy instruments which affected the behaviour of ﬁrms. It is one
of the paradoxes of the debate that those business organisations which
frequently argue for the ‘planning’ of the learning market, presumably
on the grounds of some market failure, are also the same bodies that
argue against greater regulation of workplace training even though
arguments relating to market failure operate here too.
How do employers inﬂuence the learning market in a market 
based economy? They do so by sending clear market signals about
what they are prepared to pay for, and by acting as purchasers of
training themselves. This is likely to be far more effective than sitting
on planning committees, especially for those smaller enterprises who
do not have the time for such luxuries as joining the board of a local
learning and skills council.
Do the purchasers of education and training – individuals, ﬁrms, the
Employment Service (on behalf of jobseekers) – need to be coordinated
(in a way which consumers of food do not)? It is hard to see why – they
can all make their own decisions about what education and training they
want to purchase without reference to what the others want.
There does seem to be stronger case for some form of coordination
for the providers – schools, colleges and private training organisations.
In part this is to deal with the issues raised by the need to secure economies
of scale for certain courses and think through rationally who might
develop certain new courses where there is a likely but uncertain
market demand and/or where start-up costs are problematic. 
However, existing local Learning Partnerships were set up precisely 
to perform these functions. It is not clear what additional value added
will come from the local Learning and Skills Councils. If the argument
is accepted that the local learning market does not need a great deal 
of planning; that the decisions made by local planning bodies are not
likely to be better than those made by market participants and could
be a lot worse; and that the discretionary funding of local bodies could
amount to modest sums for pump-priming; it is unclear that Councils
are required in addition to Partnerships.
One issue is administrative costs. The TECs are being abolished 
in part because the DfEE thinks their administrative costs – at about
7·5% of total funding on average (Felstead and Unwin, 1999) – are
prohibitive. It is with some irony then that 8% of the total funding 
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administrative costs. It is hard to see the 47 local Learning and Skills
Councils not having similar overheads to the 72 TECs which they 
are in part replacing.
Conclusions
Many people are put off by the language of the market. However, 
if the statement was made that institutions need to be sensitive to 
the requirements of learners and plan what they offer around those
requirements, few would object to this use of language. Yet this is just
another way of saying providers must be responsive to the market.
However, economists and others need to be aware that relationships 
in the public sector are not purely market driven, in the sense that 
there has traditionally been a collegiate relationship between staff 
at different institutions which does yield beneﬁts, but which
inappropriate reliance on the market mechanism may undermine.
Assessing the appropriateness of market institutions in different
sectors is not something that can be driven by ideology – it is an
empirical question. It is consistent to argue that the learning market
can work reasonably well in further and higher education and training,
but that a market based approach would be inefﬁcient and inequitable
in schools and in the health service. The evidence is overwhelming 
that adult learners by and large make quite rational choices based 
on a reasonably good reading of the signals coming from the labour
market, and that those who would like to ‘plan’ have – and I put 
this kindly – a much less good understanding.
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Summary
Increasingly, arrangements for the provision of learning and skills 
have been conceptualised as a learning market and models of economic
behaviour have provided useful insights into how they might be better
organised. The concept of ‘mutuality’, by contrast, stresses some of the
advantages of organisations which involve people as citizens rather than
just consumers or producers. There are grounds for suggesting that the
‘mutual’ approach might be particularly appropriate for aspects of
education and training.
Key advantages of the ‘mutual’ approach include the efﬁciency of 
‘high trust’ systems, the ability to handle circumstances where what 
is rational for the individual differs from what is rational for society,
and the capacity to engage a greater and more enthusiastic commitment 
of individuals than contract compliance. Examining the government
proposals for the reform of post-16 education and training in the light 
of the concept of mutuality suggests that some of its advantages appear 
to have been recognised, but more might usefully be incorporated.
Introduction
Over the past twenty years the world of education and training has
become accustomed to the language of the marketplace. To talk about
students as ‘customers’ or to describe college activities using the concepts
of the market no longer arouses the passion and hostility from teachers
that one frequently encountered in the late 70s and early 80s. ‘The Learning
Market’ is accepted as a description rather than an ideological challenge.This change seems to be a product of two factors. There is, on the 
one hand, an acceptance that marketing concepts can in themselves be
neutral. One can argue for a free, unregulated market or a substantially
managed and manipulated market. The tools of economic analysis can
help us understand the ways in which either sort of market can work
under different types of constraint. There is, however, another and
parallel change which has taken place over approximately the same
period. This is the increasing dominance of the view that in most spheres
of activity, a relatively free market is more likely to be effective than a
highly regulated one. It is a political change which ﬁnds its most dramatic
expression in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the wave of privati-
sation in the 80s and 90s. It ﬁnds echoes in proposals to reform education
which rely substantially on ﬁnding ways to increase competition or
consumer choice.
Taken together, these two trends have tended to straitjacket debate
about the choices we face in relation to public services. The triumph 
of the free market right and increasing discomﬁture of the traditional
left at the political level means that the choice is simply how far and
how fast to privatise. The economist can help by itemising features 
of the ideal market and directing attention to aspects of the real world
which may require attention. Effective markets require producers and
consumers to have good information, so in the education market 
there is an increased focus on information and guidance services.
There are many who see serious difﬁculties with this consensus. 
An unease about the effects of increasing privatisation coupled with 
an acceptance of some of the obvious limitations of state planning
underpins the political search for a ‘third way’. To date it is perhaps
easier to say what the ‘third way’ is not, rather than what it is, but the
will to ﬁnd an alternative to the choice between unregulated markets
and discredited state planning is very real. The articulation of the
principle of mutuality needs to be seen in this context.
Mutuality
There is growing interest in mutuality as a form of social and 
economic organisation. Ironically it may have been sparked by the
disappearance of many of the largest existing mutuals, the building
societies, several of which have converted to limited companies in 
the last few years. Despite these very public setbacks to the mutual
movement, it remains strong in a very diverse range of activities 
and in some spheres seems to be making serious growth. 
Charles Leadbeater and Ian Christie in a Demos publication 
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in the UK at the present time and begin an analysis of their particular
strengths and weaknesses.
The aim of this paper is to look at how the principles of mutuality
might inform an assessment of the proposed arrangements for learning
and skills. It offers an opportunity to step outside the debate on how far
and how fast to privatise, and provides an alternative basis for judging
the impact of proposed changes. To that extent it may help change the
terms of the debate which run the risk of being constrained within a
limited version of the market paradigm.
There are good reasons for thinking that the concept of mutuality
might help illuminate the world of learning and skills. At the common-
sense level, education and training are ‘mutual’ activities:
  We generally learn from and with others
  I cannot buy learning; I can only buy assistance to learn
  Knowledge is something that you can give to others 
without losing any of it yourself
  Training is an activity which in many cases can only 
beneﬁt an individual if it also beneﬁts someone else.
At this very superﬁcial level it is clear that education and training are
very different from many other goods and services. This is likely to
have implications for their production, distribution and exchange.
At a more theoretical level what mutuality is based on is a particular
type of engagement with social activities. The market might be seen as
a set of rules or constraints which govern interactions. We can approach
the same set of rules in different ways. To take a simple example, within
the ﬁxed rules of tennis we can approach a game as a competitor, think-
ing only of winning; as a coach encouraging a child to develop or as a
ﬂatterer, losing deliberately in order to curry favour.
The traditional debate between free markets and state planning has
cast the individual as one who engages essentially as a consumer; in the
former, one who exercises choice through purchases, and in the latter one
who either has choices made for them by experts or ‘chooses’ through
occasional ballots. It is essentially a one-dimensional role and to the
extent that it describes our behaviour particular classes of problem arise. 
One sort of problem is that if we simply act as consumers we are
increasingly confronted by unintended outcomes that we do not like. 
If we buy the cheapest eggs we end up with battery hens; if we shop 
at out of town megastores we kill off town centres. We can call these 
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1. Leadbeater C, Christie I. To our mutual advantage. DEMOS, 1999.‘responsibility’ problems. Another class of problem arises from the fact
that often what represents rational action for an individual becomes
irrational if taken by all individuals. I may choose a particular holiday
location because it is remote and peaceful; if others do the same we
defeat each other’s intentions.
People and markets – a typology
The basis of a mutual approach is that we can engage with the world of
production and distribution as citizens rather than just as consumers.
We can choose to do more than seek our own immediate advantage. 
It may make sense for us to approach the education market in this way.
To illustrate the nature of the choices we face, we can construct a
typology by combining the traditional distinctions between a 
free market and planning with that between a consumer and 
citizen as set out below.
Free market Planning
Consumer 1 2
Citizen 3 4
To caricature a little, we have at 1 the ‘irresponsible consumer’ who
buys the cheapest tuna without worrying about whether it is ‘dolphin
friendly’. At 3 we have the ‘concerned consumer’ who pays a little more
for free range eggs or bananas from the Windward Isles. At 2 might be
the stereotypical welfare dependant living in social housing which they
don’t look after. The classic mutual is located at 4. At its simplest, the
question for learning and skills is not simply where to position elements
on the left-to-right scale but also on the vertical dimension. 
To complicate it only a little, the ﬁgure above could be repeated for
producers. They too face the choice between limited economic rationality
and a wider engagement with social purposes. The importance of this
dimension is illustrated by recent FE history. The fact that some colleges
engaged in a huge expansion of dubious out of area franchising while
others did not is better explained by variations on the vertical axis than
the horizontal one. All colleges faced similar market circumstances, but
most allowed their values and mission to override a ﬁnancial opportunity.
To conclude this theoretical analysis, we can brieﬂy return to the
two classes of problem which can be caused by a narrow economic
rationality on the part of consumers or producers. ‘Responsibility’
problems, the unintended consequences of individual actions can 
be tackled by type-3 solutions – the ‘active citizen’ who thinks before
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exclusion2 considers ways of developing an active citizenry including
the concept of ‘social labelling’. The other type of problem, those issues
which individuals cannot in principle tackle alone need type-4 solutions;
the development of cooperative ways of working. In looking at the
proposals for post-16 education and training, we need to ask how 
far the proposals encourage developments which will address 
these sorts of problems. 
Strengths of mutual organisation
Before addressing learning and skills directly it is worth looking at some
rather more speciﬁc examples of the strengths of mutuals. It will help
identify analogues in the learning and skills market. From the literature
four distinct aspects of the strength of mutuality can be summarised.
Mutual organisations can work particularly efﬁciently through
being high trust organisations. They avoid the substantial overheads
needed to police interactions when individuals cannot trust each other.
The low overheads of a credit union are maintained by the ‘common
bond’. They build on the probability that individuals who know each
other and have something in common will honour their debts and
obligations. The success in business of some minority groups owes 
much to the security derived from being able to rely on someone’s word.
Trust relationships form part of what economists refer to as 
‘social capital’. Social capital, like other forms of capital can be built up
through investment or dissipated. It can yield a return. We should note
that trust is a necessary (though not always sufﬁcient) precondition for
the solution of some of the problems identiﬁed above. ‘I will if you will’
hinges on trust.
A second strength of mutuals is that they provide a context for
participants to identify the implications of their actions. A producer
cooperative works to the extent that individual participants modify
market behaviour for the beneﬁt of all. This is often underpinned by
trust (though regulation can also perform the same function – farmers
can only sell ﬂeece to the wool marketing board). The key issue is that
mutuals support a conscious engagement with the market rather than 
a limited and detached one.
A third characteristic of mutuals is that they are often capable 
of commanding a higher than normal degree of commitment from
participants. Individuals are not always concerned with proﬁt
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2. Enterprise and social exclusion. HM Treasury, 1999.maximisation and mutual arrangements are well placed to harness other
motivations. A classic case quoted by Leadbeater is the Linux software,
developed voluntarily by hundreds of individual programmers and
given away. Although it sounds improbable, this somewhat anarchic
development process has generated a product that can compete 
against the might of Microsoft.
Finally elements of mutuality help manage the special circumstances
of co-production where the output is produced by the customer. 
To purchase books all I need is money, but to learn I have to work.
Education is not unique in this respect. Health has similar characteristics
and it is perhaps no accident that ﬁtness clubs are not called ﬁtness shops.
Mutuality in education and training
One feature of the conﬂict between public and private interest 
is the development of vicious circles. A well-rehearsed example in 
the education sector, recently highlighted in a series of articles in the
Guardian3 is the destabilisation of comprehensive schools by parental
choice. Well informed parents will tend to move their able and well
supported children away from under-performing schools, thus helping
to reduce the school’s performance still further. Success breeding success
and failure breeding failure is the educational counterpart of a banking
system which takes savings from people in poor areas and lends it for
investment in rich areas. In recent FE history the excessive focus on
equalising the average level of funding (ALF) may have had a similar
effect. Colleges with a low ALF were rewarded with a greater share 
of growth funding; new uncommitted money could be devoted to 
new provision generating more students and reducing ALF again.
The preconditions for solving such problems include recognition and
mutual ownership of the problem. As indicated above there also needs
to be a reasonably secure environment for participants, otherwise the
imperative to survive will dominate. The experience of the FEFC with
consultation supports this proposition. Although meticulous in consulting
colleges on proposed changes to policy, the results of such consultations
often simply reﬂected the balance of interests in a competitive sector
rather than the merits of the case. Proposals for a London weighting,
for example, tend to attract support from London colleges and not from
those outside the capital. It is not clear how the arrangements for the
new sector will try to generate a common ownership of key problems,
whether among ‘consumers’ or ‘producers’.
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3. Davies N. Crisis, crisis, crisis: the state of our schools. In the Guardian, 1999.The analysis does not only relate to public sector institutions. One of
the best illustrations of the public/private interest conﬂict is the attitude
of many employers to training. Small employers in particular are reluctant
to train because of the fear that their employees will be poached, yet admit
to suffering from skill shortages. It is a problem clearly needing a mutual
solution. The establishment of voluntary training boards or group training
associations are possible answers which reﬂect mutual principles.
Interestingly the NTO National Council, without mentioning the 
word ‘mutual’ has recently put forward proposals along these lines 
in a paper subtitled ‘Rights and responsibilities in a new learning age’.4
The development of arrangements for accreditation offers a striking
illustration of mutual principles being put into operation in the FE sector.
The growth of Open College Networks, (OCNs) which provide accred-
itation for college devised programmes represent a development similar
to the creation of Linux software in the IT industry. Thousands of college
staff give time and effort to develop OCN accreditation in a way which
contrasts markedly with the widespread resentment of the major examin-
ing bodies and regulatory authorities. The key difference is ownership.
College staff see OCNs as meeting the needs of their learners.
Consideration needs to be given to how this enthusiasm can 
be harnessed for wider purposes. A mutual approach to the
development of a credit framework immediately commends itself.
Learning to succeed
The White Paper Learning to succeed proposes radical changes to the
way in which the organisation of education and training for those over
the age of 16 will be planned and delivered. In places it makes explicit
reference to market concepts, although it is not immediately clear whether
the resulting market will be more or less regulated than at present.
References to concepts derived from mutuality are less explicit though
there are several references to partnership. An analysis of the proposals
in the light of the concepts around mutuality is illuminating.
One test which might be applied to the White Paper is to assess
whether it seeks to build high trust or low trust structures. To the extent
that it encourages the former it may be said to be capitalising on the
strengths of mutuality; to the extent that it does not it is perhaps
missing an opportunity. An initial analysis suggests that the 
document is not consistent.
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4. Towards a new investment framework for skills. NTO National Council, 1999.The proposed arrangements for inspection seem to move away from
trust. Current arrangements by FEFC and TSC are ﬁrmly based on
support for self-assessment. They seek to involve providing institutions
as partners and evidence from both sectors suggests that this has been
successful. The new proposals are for inspection to be more external and
separated from quality improvement. The analysis of mutuals suggests
that this is likely to be the less cost-effective solution. In practical terms
it raises fears that energy will be spent on proving quality rather than
improving it.
In other respects the White Paper proposals are supportive of the
development of more mutual arrangements. The support for local
learning partnerships is the clearest example. Many of the problems 
of local provision cannot be solved by competition or by individual
action. There is a need to collaborate to protect specialist provision;
rationalise if there is uneconomic duplication of classes and ensure
that student support funds are spent for the beneﬁt of learners rather
than the market position of institutions. There needs to be more
recognition however that collaboration cannot just be prescribed. 
It needs speciﬁc support and not to be undermined by other aspects 
of the new arrangements such as ‘opening up the market to new
providers’. There is little indication of how a collaborative 
approach is to be fostered in the White Paper.
One particularly compelling aspect of mutuals is that they illustrate
the advantages of engaging broadly with an individual as a member 
of a community rather than narrowly as a customer or producer. 
Their experience in many sectors suggests that greater efforts and
expertise can be drawn on if participants are so regarded. In this
respect the White Paper is particularly deﬁcient. Whether it is 
dealing with individuals or organisations, with consumers or
producers, the White Paper focuses on their narrow contractual 
role rather than how they might engage more widely. 
Two examples will sufﬁce:
  The arrangements set out in the White Paper are highly centralised.
There are local councils but they are merely arms of the central council.
They have no independent legitimacy. In almost every other OECD
country local democratic structures are associated with the manage-
ment of education and training. Local communities have rights, 
but also responsibilities; they usually have to pay some of the costs.
In England, almost uniquely in the developed world, they are relegated
to the role of consumer. It misses an opportunity to engage local
skills, energies and resources in a truly mutual enterprise.
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as customers is paralleled by a limited vision of how those seen as
providers can contribute. They are there to be steered, inspected
and incentivised. There is little recognition of the fact that to a 
large extent, they still share the aims of the enterprise: or that it is
the extent of their commitment, vision and imagination rather than
the composition of a local committee, which will determine whether
the system is responsive and dynamic. In the absence of commitment
there are serious risks of goal displacement illustrated to date by
tariff farming and the excesses of franchising.
Indeed, the reliance on competition alone to bring about quality 
and efﬁciency neglects the growing trend for successful businesses to
develop long term cooperative relationships with their supply chain. 
To quote a recent author:
The traditional adversarial way of interacting with suppliers
attempts to minimise the price of purchased goods and services
by playing a large number of suppliers off against one another
through arms length, short term contractual arrangements …
While this approach may gain price concessions in the short 
term it cannot establish the trust, commitment and information
sharing necessary to achieve mutual success.5
Conclusions
The development of thinking about mutual forms of organisation is
capable of shedding useful light on the Government’s proposals for a
new learning market as set out in Learning to succeed. In particular,
the concept of mutuality highlights the need to think about aspects of
social capital and its contribution to efﬁciency and effectiveness in the
market for education and training. We need to ask whether any new
arrangements are likely to add to or subtract from the social capital
stock; while there are some positive features there are aspects of the
White Paper which appear to dissipate it. 
Mutuality also offers an effective way of managing markets where the
external costs of individual transactions are signiﬁcant. The education and
training market is one where some of the external costs are particularly
high; mutual approaches to organising the relationships between pro-
viders and consumers, and between providers and purchasers might
usefully be given greater prominence in the proposed arrangements.
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Conventionally a ‘market’ consists of consumers who buy goods 
or services from a producer. A problem when applying the concept 
of a ‘market’ to learning is that:
  Often there is a ‘proxy’ customer acting on behalf of the learner
  We always have to use proxies for what is purchased, 
since learning as such cannot be bought
  Sometimes it is necessary to make the purchase using a proxy for cash.
This paper explains why this is the case, and:
  Identiﬁes some of the implications of there being multiple ‘customers’
  Examines the extent to which Individual Learning Accounts either
could deal with these implications or need to take them on board
  Discusses whether individuals would wish to purchase different 
‘proxies’ for learning from those used by funding councils
  Explores how learning programmes and qualiﬁcations in particular,
but also inspection and regulatory regimes, might have to change 
in order to facilitate a learning market in which the individual
learner is the primary customer.
I have to appeal for the reader’s understanding here. As someone who
works with curricula and qualiﬁcations I have come to realise that 
I cannot get away with ignorance of funding, because of its impact 
on quality and entitlement. For similar reasons, I believe that those
interested in funding and markets need to have an understanding of
the ‘core business’ that is being resourced. I have attempted to avoid
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on the new learning market, 17 November 1999.jargon and complexity as much as possible, but in the end, 
as Rousseau arrogantly said:
I warn the reader that this (chapter) requires careful reading, 
and that I am unable to make myself clear to those who refuse 
to be attentive.1
Who pays?
Relating payment to beneﬁt gained
It is usual for the consumer also to be the person who pays. However,
in the case of education and training it is common for a third party, 
for instance the State or an employer, to pay on behalf of the learner.
The third party may meet the full cost, or may make a contribution. 
If by ‘consumer’ we mean the person or organisation beneﬁting 
from what is provided, then a further complication is that ‘learning’ as
a product (if that is what it is) brings beneﬁt to more than one consumer
simultaneously. For instance, the development of occupational compe-
tence may be to the advantage, in varying degrees, not only of the
learners themselves but also their employers, families and the
community at large. Therefore one question to be asked is: 
‘How far can the cost of learning be distributed fairly 
amongst the beneﬁciaries?’.
It may be important to distinguish between direct and indirect beneﬁt.
More precisely, the beneﬁts may fall on a spectrum from direct to indirect.
An employer, for instance, may pay for the training of an employee
because the company has a direct and immediate need for that employee
to possess a given occupational competence (which might be repre-
sented by an NVQ). Alternatively, a ﬁrm might sponsor an employee 
in obtaining a vocationally oriented degree, on the grounds that it 
will beneﬁt over time from the enhanced ‘human resource’ that results. 
At the other extreme of the spectrum, the Ford motor company has an
employee development (EDAP) scheme which pays for any learning an
employee wishes to undertake, up to a speciﬁed annual ﬁnancial limit,
on condition that it is not vocational. This scheme is intended to produce
the kind of indirect beneﬁts (in terms of morale, staff retention, etc.)
that also result from other employee facilities, such as access to 
social clubs or occupational pension schemes.
Another feature of learning as a product is that it may, in the short
term at least, encumber the ‘consumer’ with costs that are additional
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1. Rousseau J-J. The social contract. Book 3, chapter 1, ﬁrst paragraph.to, and sometimes greater than, any fees payable to the provider. 
For all learners these may include the costs of travel, special clothing,
learning materials and equipment such as calculators or kitchen knives.
Of greater signiﬁcance for adult learners may be childcare costs, or the
need for maintenance payments to cover loss of income. A consequence
of this is that a third party that wishes to promote learning may need to
make payments to the learner rather than, or as well as, the provider.
For the most part, this paper will focus on that funding which has 
to reach a ‘provider’ of learning, though issues relating to funding 
the learners will arise.
One way of creating a more straightforward ‘learning market’
would be to enable each contributor to purchase that part of the
learning programme from which they beneﬁted. Thus that part of a
vocational programme which directly beneﬁted the employer would 
be funded by them, whilst another part which the State wished to see
as part of the programme (possibly in order to develop the economy 
in the long term) would receive government funding. The individual
would fund aspects of the programme that improved their own promo-
tion prospects or lifestyle, but which produced no direct beneﬁt to
others. However, this approach would have signiﬁcant implications 
for the structure and organisation of qualiﬁcations and learning
programmes. This issue will be addressed in a later section.
Individual Learning Accounts (ILAs) 
Their contribution to a learning market
Another approach that would appear to simplify the ‘market’ is one that
channels all funding, from whatever source and for whatever purpose,
through an Individual Learning Account (ILA). The individual learner
then purchases whatever is required for their learning, and is the only
one who has a ‘contract’ with the provider. 
The green paper The learning age outlined the following purposes
for ILAs:
  Increasing total funding by providing a greater incentive for 
    individuals, and 
    businesses
to match the Government’s investment
  Increasing choice for individuals
  Encouraging individuals to take responsibility 
for their own learning
  Increasing the responsiveness of institutions to individual’s needs.
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on the development of individual learning accounts:
  That individuals are best placed to choose 
what and how they want to learn
  That responsibility for investing in learning is shared.
ILAs and learner control
The ﬁrst of these principles is supported by that part of the later 
White Paper Learning to succeed2 which advocates ‘a system driven 
by the needs of the learner’ (page 3). However, it makes an interesting
contrast (to put it tactfully) with paragraph 3·7 of the same document
which says the functions of the national Learning and Skills Council
(LSC) include ‘ensuring that high quality post-16 provision is available
to meet the needs of employers, individuals and communities.’ 
The implication here is that these needs are not identical, 
and it will therefore be for the LSC to be an intermediary, 
acting as both a planning agent and as the primary customer. 
This interpretation is reinforced by the later Learning to succeed:
update3 where it is stated that:
Our expectation is that the local LSCs will make the running on
identifying the skill needs of the local economy and community
[their emphasis] and using a powerful range of levers to ensure
they are met, including:
  negotiating the budgets and plans for colleges and work-based
training providers thereby exercising a key inﬂuence on which 
FE courses and training programmes will be funded and in 
what volume in their areas;
  deciding how, within nationally agreed limits, the national
funding tariff will be varied locally to give providers clear
incentives to meet priority local skill needs.
ILAs and saving to learn
With regard to the second principle, ‘that responsibility for investing
in learning is shared’, it seems to me that the interpretation of this has
changed over time. When ﬁrst enunciated, the aim of using individual
learning accounts to ‘encourage people to save to provide for their own
training needs’ seemed central to the Treasury’s thinking4 and to what
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4. Treasury post-budget press release, May 1998.the Pathﬁnder prospectus5 said about the funding of the Uﬁ. Since then,
awareness has grown that the majority of the population is unlikely to
be able to tie up signiﬁcant amounts of cash in an ILA. This is even
more true of that section of the population which is most in need of
additional learning opportunities. Even if individuals have any surplus
income, other ﬁnancial products are competing for it. For instance, the
recently introduced Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), appear to be
more attractive than ILAs. ISAs offer the presumed tax advantages of
ILAs without imposing any restriction on how the savings may be spent.
ISAs also have an annual limit of £5000, which is more than most
people will be able to save in any case. 
A person earning the proposed minimum wage and working the
maximum weekly hours permitted by the Working Time Directive, 
and taking no holidays, will earn less than £9000 per annum. It is
clear, therefore, that many of the people with the greatest learning
needs, and who are least likely to be already beneﬁting from structured
learning opportunities, will not be able to afford to save in order to
learn. Others who are able to save are likely to prefer to do so via an
ISA. If special advantages (for example, discounted fees) are granted 
to those paying from an ILA, then the ﬁnancially astute consumer 
will nevertheless hold the resources in an ISA, only transferring 
them into an ILA at the last moment.
ILAs and third-party contributions; 
from employers and the State
The educationally disadvantaged are also more likely to be working 
for ﬁrms, or even a number of ﬁrms on a part-time or casual basis, 
who will not be willing to invest in ILAs. In any case, most commen-
tators now agree that employers will not be willing to put a signiﬁcant
amount of money into accounts an indeterminate time before it is
required. The most they will do is to promise to pay an agreed 
amount, for speciﬁed purposes, when the time comes. That is, 
they would offer a ‘credit note’, and a conditional one at that. 
More recently, the policy debate has shifted its emphasis, 
with there being more talk of the value of ILAs in terms of: 
  Making providers more responsive
  Increasing the motivation of learners by emphasising their role 
as customers, and by making transparent the investment being
made in them by third parties.
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5. University for Industry. Pathﬁnder prospectus. DfEE, 1998, paragraph 6·5.The assumption usually made is that these objectives would be achieved
if the State routed its funding to colleges and other providers via ILAs
instead of via funding councils, thus making the situation rather more
like a normal ‘market’, where the individual consumer has the purchasing
power. However, it is certain that Government, like employers:
  Will not be willing to put signiﬁcant sums of money into an account
until just before (or even after) a purchase has been made 
  Will impose conditions on the purposes for which its 
funding can be used.
The cost of administering ILAs
Since banks and other ﬁnancial institutions cannot invest ‘promises to
pay’ (whether these come from employers, Government or individuals)
on the money markets in order to cover their costs, as they would for
normal accounts, this raises the question of the administrative cost 
of routing funding via ILAs. These costs could be reduced if ILAs 
were integrated with other ﬁnancial products, rather than being in
competition with them, and/or if they were administered using existing
funding or taxation systems. However, and whichever approach is
adopted, funding which involves millions of individual transactions 
is bound to be more expensive than the kind of ‘batch processing’ 
of claims which a funding council administers.
The fact that it involves ‘batch processing’ does not mean that
FEFC-type funding is not triggered by millions of individual choices.
As such, it does encourage and reward college responsiveness, and can
be tuned to do this to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon such
things as the degree of institutional instability that is deemed acceptable.
I leave it to others to show how far it is possible to promote respon-
siveness (and to do so more cheaply) in this way, but I believe that 
ILAs have little advantage in this respect.
The unique contribution of ILAs
With regard to the functions so far considered, the special advantage
of ILAs may be the possibility that they would ‘empower’ learners 
and potential learners through putting them in the role of consumers.
Even here there is an important caveat. Insofar as this empowerment
comes from having choice, limitations are immediately apparent. It has
been argued above that both employers and Government will impose
conditions on how the funds they supply may be spent. Individuals will,
of course, be free to spend their own money as they wish, but are unlikely
to have much to spare before they have enhanced their skills and
42 The new learning marketemployability by embarking on a learning programme. It is in recognition
of this that university students are offered a loan facility. 
This indicates a second important role for ILAs. They have the
potential to provide the equivalent of a common currency operating
within a ‘common market’. By analysing the funding of all education
and training as if they were funded via ILAs we are enabled to identify
anomalies: gaps, inequities, and the failure to transfer good practice from
one area to another. Sometimes these relate to the entitlements due to
the individual. Sometimes they reveal different assumptions about the
conditions that it is reasonable to apply to different kinds of provider. 
To obtain this beneﬁt it is not necessary actually to use identical
systems of funding for all provision. The approach would be to use
ILAs as the base method, only allowing modiﬁcations to it when the
special circumstances of a sector, an area of study or an individual
showed that this was justiﬁed.
The applicability of ILAs to all post-16 provision
The principles which The learning age said underlie ILAs might be
thought to apply as much to school sixth forms and universities as to
training and further education. In this context, the fact that only College
and TEC funding was explicitly mentioned in connection with ILAs is
signiﬁcant. One reason for this may be that – despite the statement in the
Green Paper that ‘Learning Accounts will be available to everyone’6 –
in fact the Government is mainly thinking in terms of ILAs for those 
in employment, and therefore learning ‘part-time’.7
A less respectable reason for only mentioning further education
and TECs may be that although there are moves to ‘level the playing
ﬁeld’ as between further education and school funding, Government is
likely to be very reluctant to risk further disturbing school sixth forms
by funding them via ILAs. (A recent discussion document goes so far as 
to promise that there will be ‘no noticeable change in audit burdens 
on schools as a result of any new arrangements’.8)
Similarly, it is evident that Government thinks that it has already
been in enough hot water over changes in the funding of universities
and university students, and does not wish to stoke up the ﬁre further.
Understandable though this might be from the political point of view,
the fact is that university students already – in effect – have access to 
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7. The distinction between part-time and full-time study is becoming increasingly blurred.
Many ‘full-time’ students have a part-time job to help pay their way, and many part-time
students have as many taught hours per week as full-timers.
8. School sixth form funding: a consultation paper. DfEE, July 1999.a learning account from which they can borrow. This cannot be
ignored. It immediately raises the question as to whether the same
facility can and should be extended to (say) those studying at
technician level or on a part-time basis.
Using ILAs as a means of offering loans
Although the switch from grants to loans is seen by many university
students as a backward step, for many other learners the right to a
cheap loan might be seen as a considerable advance on their present
situation. Also, while this disparity of treatment exists, there may be 
a tendency for 18 year olds to take the full-time university route in
preference (for instance) to a work-based route which might provide
some of them with a more amenable learning environment and more
appropriate learning outcomes. 
It is for these reasons that some agencies are investigating the
possibility of providing income contingent loans to individuals. The
Kent Learning and Business Link Company, supported by the Gatsby
Foundation, is running a pilot project which will offer loans of between
£500 and £3000 to up to 100 people, in part to encourage them to
maintain their original ILAs. These loans are repayable, but without
interest. MC Consultancy is setting up another project to explore the
implications of income contingency, a feature which is considered
essential to any broader-based scheme, and something which would
distinguish this approach from earlier ones such as Career Development
Loans. The availability of income contingent loans would have a
number of potential advantages, which could include:
  Less onerous audit controls than required by a grant (for instance,
university students are not required to provide evidence about 
how their student loan is spent)
  An increase of total resources available for learning without an
increase in conventional taxation (the original loan capital would 
be diverted from existing grants in aid, and would be augmented
when loans begin to be repaid, or more quickly if the loan could 
be ‘sold’ to commercial banks)
  The fact that the Government rather than the individual bears 
the risk if the rhetoric that ‘learning pays’ proves untrue. 
This approach comes closer to empowering the learner as a consumer.
However, those wishing to avail themselves of income contingency
may have to be restricted to that learning which appears to provide 
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is part of a general entitlement, such as that which applies to all
students taking a ﬁrst degree.
Loans could also be used to meet learner costs for such things 
as child care or travel, which in many cases may be a more 
signiﬁcant issue than course fees.
Provision which is more expensive than average
Whether ILAs contain cash or ‘promises to pay’, there is an obvious
problem in that some provision – particularly that requiring technical
plant and equipment – would take more out of the account, or require
the account holder to borrow more in order to participate. On the other
hand, it is not the case that engineers (say) are likely eventually to earn
salaries sufﬁcient to pay back signiﬁcantly more than accountants (say)
would be required to, even though engineering training would be more
expensive. Without government intervention, this would skew choice
away from some areas of learning of considerable economic importance.
It therefore seems likely that some sort of ‘notional currency’ would 
be created, such that the ‘cost’ of provision was evened out. 
There will also be individual learners who learn more slowly than
average or who require more support in order to learn. Once again,
either their accounts would have to be augmented by government
funding, or providers would need to qualify for an additional
subvention when catering for them. 
ILAs and the metaphor of the market
At this point we should pause to note that accounts containing 
‘credit notes’ rather than real cash, and which incorporate a ‘token’
currency, the use of which triggers an additional subsidy to providers
of certain kinds of provision, do not ﬁt easily into the conventional
notion of a ‘free market’.
Appendix 1 summarises in chart form the extent to which
individuals, ﬁrms, and Government are likely to be willing to 
offer cash, promises to pay, or loans, in order to fund learning.
The future for ILAs
This analysis is not meant to be destructive of a potentially 
powerful concept. What it does show is: 
  The need to be clear about which purposes ILAs best serve, 
and which could also be achieved by alternative means
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at least, to all post-compulsory learning, and not just to those
sectors which are of lower status
  The importance of being realistic about their limitations 
as vehicles for generating additional contributions from 
individuals or employers
  Their potential value as a means of enabling learners of all kinds 
to borrow in order to invest in their own learning future
  The fact that borrowing to learn, if linked to income contingent
repayments, is the most likely means of enabling learners to express
and act on their own judgements as to their needs and preferences.
What is being purchased?
This is a question of real practical importance, since:
  We inherit different approaches in different sectors 
of education and training
  These approaches have changed over time
  Different approaches might be preferred by individuals deploying
Individual Learning Accounts than are currently being used 
by Funding Councils.
Let us consider some examples:
  A person wishing to learn to drive purchases a number of hours 
of instruction, given on a one-to-one basis, and – perhaps – access
to equipment in the form of a dual control car. The success rate of
the driving school may inﬂuence the learner’s choice of school, 
but does not form part of any contract.
  A person wishing to get ﬁtter may join a health club, purchasing
unlimited access to speciﬁed facilities for a period such as a year, 
an initial diagnostic session, and guaranteed supervision when 
using equipment. The availability of the equipment may not 
be guaranteed at all times, nor may the group sizes.
  Some short management courses specify as part of the contract 
the name and curriculum vitae of the course leader, the maximum
group size and the facilities of the management centre. The aim 
of the course is speciﬁed, but not the content or processes.
  Students learning word-processing via ‘ﬂexible learning’ are 
given access to an ‘IT workshop’ for a speciﬁed number of hours, 
at times to suit themselves, to an instructional programme on 
a CD-ROM, but to no teaching other than an initial 
introductory tutorial.
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by their trainees of speciﬁed learning outcomes, usually measured
by NVQs. The amount and means of instruction did not form part
of the contract.9
  FEFC funding for colleges is triggered when individuals:
    Receive advice and guidance at entry
    Attend a learning programme
    Reach their qualiﬁcation aims.
The majority of FEFC funding comes from the ‘on programme’
element, which is audited termly. Therefore, a failure to retain students
for the full year carries signiﬁcant ﬁnancial penalties. Institutional
stability is supported by a guarantee of a minimum percentage of 
the previous year’s income. It is of course possible to vary any of 
these proportions within the overall funding model, if that is desired.
  University students gain membership of the institution in return for
their fees. They are entitled to use its facilities, and although they may
expect teaching no guarantee is given of its nature or duration. This
vagueness may not remain tenable as students become more personally
responsible for paying fees, though the fact that they have to be members
in order to enter for university examinations may be a limiting factor on
any ‘consumer revolt’. Funding is not linked to student achievement. 
  State school pupils have a guarantee of:
    A minimum number of taught hours per week 
    The fact that the national curriculum will be covered 
    Staff who are formally qualiﬁed as teachers as well as 
in their chosen discipline.
School funding is triggered by annual audits of student numbers. 
There is no ﬁnancial penalty for poor achievement, though this may
affect recruitment.
These examples show not only that what a provider is contracted 
to supply can vary, but also that – whatever it is – it is not ‘learning’ 
as such. Still less is it ‘education’. Since both are intangibles, one 
or more proxies have to be used.
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9. This was not an educationally sensible method since it produced a conﬂict of interest 
for instructors. They had to be involved in the assessment process, since NVQs require
observation of performance, but were also paid according to the results of this assessment.
It was administratively convenient, since it replaced a complex system of auditing daily
attendance (when providers were paid by the taught hour) with a single and easily auditable
funding ‘trigger’ – the achievement of a qualiﬁcation. It would have been a more viable
method of funding A-level provision, since this qualiﬁcation is largely assessed externally.
This has, however, for some reason, never been suggested.Each proxy has its own set of risks and advantages.
  Funding teaching can protect valuable processes and 
professional expertise, but tends to encourage inefﬁciency.
  Funding facilities protects the infrastructure, 
but may not promote effectiveness.
  Funding outcomes promotes efﬁciency, but may not protect 
the infrastructure or preserve learning processes which people 
are entitled to experience. 
The overall problem is that effective learning requires a number 
of elements to be in balance, and most systems of funding tend to
emphasise one element at the expense of others. This is partly a matter
of tradition, partly one of fashion, and sometimes determined by what
is administratively convenient. For instance, funding ‘taught hours’ is
never likely to be a popular method with funding councils because it 
is onerous to audit and encourages over-teaching. On the other hand, 
it is the most straightforward and popular means by which individual
adults can ‘contract’ with a provider.
The effect of tradition is more subtle, but as an example one might
characterise (or caricature) the situation up to now in post-compulsory
education and training (PCET) as follows: 
  In higher education the emphasis has been on processes, such as
academic autonomy, peer review and such things as the Oxbridge
tutorial system, in the belief that this will mean that the learning
outcomes can be safely left to take care of themselves 
  An attempt has been made to control and deﬁne further education
and training through the speciﬁcation of learning outcomes, plus a
predominant external involvement in their assessment, in the belief
that this will promote maximum ﬂexibility and efﬁciency in provision.
Both approaches are now under pressure. Universities are ﬁnding that lack
of clarity about which outcomes justify a good degree can cause them
to have to play safe with regard to admission criteria and assessment
methods if they are to maintain their reputations. Inspection of colleges
(and even more of private training providers) has shown that control of
outcomes does not ensure adequate learning programmes or teaching. 
In general, I want to argue that it is dangerous to discuss funding 
or ‘learning markets’ without an appreciation of what goes to make 
up an effective learning programme, or more broadly, a ‘quality
education’. I therefore make no apology for a modicum of 
curriculum theory at this point.
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following elements is required.
  Appropriate content, which can in turn be broken down into:
    Subject matter (facts and information)
    Skills (mental and physical)
    Concepts (such as ‘forces’ in physics or ‘imagery’ in literature)
    The ability to select from and integrate the above to address 
a particular problem or issue. 
  Valid and reliable assessment
To be valid this assessment has to relate to the various aspects of
content listed above. Too often, economic, political or administrative
priorities require that a given method of assessment is taken as given,
usually that which is most reliable whilst being cheap. This can be 
at the expense of validity, and can result in the content being
determined by the assessment method.
  Learning processes and experiences (such as minimum ﬂying hours
for a pilot, or personal tutorials for Oxbridge students).
  Facilities and learning materials: access to a library, 
on-line materials, workshops, studio theatres, etc.
  A learning environment, which can include: the company of other
learners; sporting and social facilities; a ‘conducive atmosphere’.
  Expert and skilled teachers and tutors.
The role of inspection and of regulatory bodies
One way of achieving the balance outlined above is to combine a 
‘learning market’ (which encourages quality and ﬂexibility through
competition) with suitable controls. Two instruments available to
Government, and which have been considerably enhanced over recent
years, are inspection of provision and regulation of qualiﬁcations.10
Unfortunately, both have developed a reputation for defending the
Government’s interests as much as that of consumers.
For instance, whilst doing valuable work in exposing weak practice 
by teachers and institutions, inspectorates have fought shy of identi-
fying problems in delivery which have been caused by funding (levels
or methods), or by inadequate (usually mechanistic and over-engineered)
government inspired curricula, testing regimes, or qualiﬁcations.
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10. Another is the use of performance indicators and benchmarks. Adrian Perry addresses 
this area in his paper (chapter 5 in this publication): Performance indicators: 
‘Measure for measure’ or ‘A comedy of errors’?.Regulatory bodies have clariﬁed qualiﬁcations frameworks and
improved consistency, but have – in the case of the former National
Council for Vocational Qualiﬁcations (NCVQ) in particular – fallen to
the temptation of going way beyond specifying the minimum criteria
which qualiﬁcations should meet in order to satisfy the public interest.
For instance, rather than saying that vocational qualiﬁcations should meet
employers’ requirements, and challenging awarding bodies to produce
evidence that they do, NCVQ and its successor body the Qualiﬁcations
and Curriculum Authority (QCA) have deﬁned what these requirements
are, or at least they have endorsed other bodies which have claimed to be
able to do this. The result has been that local providers may be refused
funding for schemes which they have negotiated with local employers:
schemes which they know meet the needs of, for instance, small ﬁrms
(not well represented on national ‘standard-setting’ bodies) or companies
working more ﬂexibly than the qualiﬁcation structure anticipated.
At its worst, this has prevented providers from competing in terms
of product design, and restricted them to competing in terms of 
service standards. 
A useful analogy may be made with provision of housing. 
The development of the ‘Parker Morris Standards’ which speciﬁed 
such things as minimum ventilation requirements, damp-protection,
and room heights did much to prevent a free market producing the slums
of the future, whilst preserving consumer choice and the possibility of
innovation. When (local and central) government went beyond this to
develop and act on its own more extensive view of what was good for
residents and what looked tidy and consistent, they produced the
disaster of some post-war housing estates.
‘Bite-sized chunks’: adapting learning 
programmes to suit a ‘market’
There are signs in the recent White Paper Learning to succeed that a
division is being created between provision for 16–19 year olds, where
priority is being given to coherence, and provision for older learners,
where priority is being given to ﬂexibility and accessibility.
White Papers and University for Industry (Uﬁ) documentation have
both mentioned the importance of being able to offer to older learners
what have been called ‘bite-sized chunks’, so that they can:
  Fit ‘learning episodes’ into the rest of their schedule
  Have encouraging feedback on their progress
  Pay for their learning in instalments.
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the various, primary beneﬁciaries of learning, then this would ease 
the problem of who pays for what. 
However, it is important to ask the question, ‘chunks of what?’. 
For instance, the fact that NVQs are made up of units does not
necessarily mean that they meet the need of allowing for incremental
learning. This is because the units in question are sub-sets of occupational
standards, based on functions, rather than being learning modules. 
In some cases, they do not even form free-standing parts of a qualiﬁcation.
This can be best illustrated with an example:
The NVQ in Vehicle Mechanical and Electronic Systems contains,
amongst others, units relating to the following functions:
  Routinely servicing all aspects of the vehicle
  Identifying faults which affect system performance
  Rectifying faults in vehicle systems.
None of these units can be obtained until the functions concerned have
been applied to all the vehicle systems, such as the engine, cooling and
heating systems, fuel, ignition, brakes, bodywork, etc. In practice,
learners usually spend time on each system in turn, learning in each
case how to service them, diagnose faults, and rectify them. As a result,
they do not acquire any units until the end of their programme, when
they get them all simultaneously. 
The conventional City and Guilds qualiﬁcation in the same subject
is also unitised, but is structured according to the parts or systems
of a vehicle. This structure would allow for the fact that an employee
working in a vehicle body shop might ﬁnd that the employer would be
willing to pay for their acquisition of the unit on servicing and repairing
bodywork, whereas they might have pay themselves to acquire units
relating to (say) ignition systems.
Appendix 2 shows these alternative approaches in chart form. 
Another kind of problem arises when areas such as numeracy 
are embedded in the vocational units, rather than being freestanding.
This means that there is no facility for recognising that an individual has
greater numeracy than the job requires. Although individuals might be
expected to pay for the additional learning themselves, the opportunity
to acquire it could be an important factor in gaining promotion.11
Who pays, and for what?  51
11. The German ‘Dual’ system separates theory from practice and teaches conventional 
subjects in a way which we now ﬁnd old-fashioned, but which makes it easier to 
allocate responsibility for funding.However, the qualiﬁcations have to be structured so as to allow 
for such choices by individuals, which at present they are not. 
Although adult learners are likely to prefer qualiﬁcations and
learning programmes that are designed to allow for episodic learning,
regulatory bodies tend to worry about the danger of incoherence and
fragmentation. The technical answer to this is to provide an additional
unit of assessment that is ‘synoptic’, in that it tests the ability to
integrate and deploy the other units appropriately. 
Some conclusions
  The metaphor of the ‘market’ has to be used with care 
in a situation where the participant, the funder and the 
beneﬁciary may not always coincide. 
  Individual Learning Accounts could be a vehicle for the development
of a larger and more straightforward market, particularly if their 
use for making loans was developed. ILAs may be of symbolic
importance in empowering learners, but there are probably 
cheaper and easier ways of promoting responsiveness in providers. 
  What is purchased is never learning itself, but some proxy for it.
The ‘proxies’ that are used to trigger the funding provided by
funding councils may not be the same as those which an individual
would wish to ‘contract’ to purchase from a provider. 
  Whichever proxies are used, they will tend to emphasise only one
aspect of what goes to make up effective learning. Other aspects may
need to be protected via the work of inspectorates and regulatory
bodies. These organisations may have to re-orient their operations
to take account of this, and to focus on individual learners as 
their clients, as opposed to Government.
  An active and ﬂexible learning market will need to allow for learning
to be acquired in a number of separate episodes. Our existing qualiﬁ-
cations structure and occupational standards were not designed to
make this easy, and will have to be fundamentally reviewed with 
this in mind. To be of good quality, they must be ﬁt for this purpose.
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Componentsof and contributors 
toIndividual Learning Accounts
Individual 
or family Employer State
Cash ?1 No2 No2
Promises to pay Yes Yes3 Yes 3
Loan facility4 No No (?) Yes
Notes
1. In most cases it would be most sensible for individuals to accumulate
their savings in a general-purpose account which also gives tax
advantages, such as an ISA. They could then transfer monies into 
an ILA when and if it was necessary in order to gain any additional
beneﬁts, such as discounted fees. On the other hand, family members
contributing to other’s accounts might wish to use an ILA from the
start in order to ensure that the funds can only be used for the 
purpose they intend.
2. Small amounts of cash might be donated in order to create goodwill.
However, neither Government nor companies could tolerate the
cashﬂow problems and the loss of earnings from interest that would
result from payment into individual accounts of signiﬁcant sums 
of money – particularly without any deﬁnite knowledge of when 
the individual would make use of it. 
3. Employers and Government, in particular, would ﬁnd it difﬁcult 
to manage a large number of outstanding promises to pay, with no
control over when they might be used. It is therefore likely that they
would wish to inﬂuence the phasing of their use, ensuring that not 
too many were activated simultaneously. This would be in addition 
to the inﬂuence they would wish to exert over the kind of learning 
for which their money was used. Therefore most promises to pay
would be conditional in two senses.
4. There is considerable evidence that repayment of loans has to be
income contingent before most people will contemplate them. 
Such loans will therefore be a matter for the State to provide, 
rather than individuals or employers.
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Appendix 2
Units of (NVQ) assessment versus 
modules of (course) assessment
Systems
Cooling Electrical  and
Functions and heating electronic Bodywork Etc.
Routinely service
Identify faults
Rectify faults
Etc.
For the NVQ (level 2) in Vehicle Maintenance and Electronic Systems,
each unit of assessment is based on one of a number of functions. 
A sample of these functions is shown above (on the vertical axis). 
In order to be awarded any unit, a candidate must demonstrate the
function with regard to the full range of vehicle systems, a sample 
of which is also shown above (on the horizontal axis).
However, in practice an employee will work on a particular 
vehicle system, such as the braking system, and learn how to service 
it, identify faults and rectify them. Although a coherent area within the
workplace, becoming competent in with regard to the braking system
would not gain them a unit. Further, if they had no opportunity to
work on some systems at all (such as bodywork, which might be 
sub-contracted to another ﬁrm) then they would gain no units at all. 
This means that despite being unitised, NVQs do not necessarily
provide the ability to accumulate the ‘bite-sized chunks’ which adults
purchasing their learning a piece at a time might require.
This is not a fundamental problem, since as the above grid shows,
the same area of work could be analysed differently so as to provide 
for this accumulation, without neglecting the occupational standards.
It is just a matter of dividing the same ‘occupational standards’ in an
alternative way. 
What is crucial is that the design principles upon which
qualiﬁcations and learning programmes are based should take 
account of the needs of individuals who may wish or need to 
undertake ‘episodic’ learning.References
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Summary
The current system of providing public services by purchaser/provider
split, and management by audit is weakened by the difﬁculties of identi-
fying accurate performance indicators (PIs). The problems – data capture,
social adjustment, fraud, tariff farming, cost and inﬂexibility – are greater
than have previously been thought. The selection of proxies for PIs
often leads to distortion of provider effort. 
Government needs to make secure judgements about value for money
and quality. It also needs evidence to base the selection of preferred
suppliers in a managed supply chain relationship. To be effective in
their role, PIs should be used with caution, and seen as supporting the
management of supply chain relations rather than making ﬁnal judge-
ments of provider quality or cost. Judgements need to be supplemented
by a strong research base, and by developing longer-term indicators.
This will enable the development, through time, of a third way to
manage a more effective post-16 sector – taking the best from the
traditional public sector virtues and market disciplines whilst 
avoiding fetishistic contract compliance and audit.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a major change in the way we run the
public sector – a change that has drawn little attention from the public
or press. Public services used to be delivered more or less directly by
central or local government. This is no longer the case. What happens
is this: ﬁrstly, an agency at arms length from Government is created.This agency is assigned the tasks that it is required to do and given 
the funds to get on with it. The agency then purchases the provision
from institutions that have been made independent of local or national
government. They have Chief Executives, develop mission statements,
are required to make strategic plans and operating statements, undertake
consumer surveys, and hit targets. Any initiatives or pilots beyond the
base are launched via ‘challenge funds’ in which institutions and agencies
are invited to bid for the opportunity to run a project for additional cash.
Compliance with targets and conditions is checked by exhaustive audit
processes: institutional success judged by performance indicators.
Benchmarks and league tables are used to judge how efﬁciently 
one institution performs in relation to another. 
With the obsession with franchise and accountability, control, 
cuts, sleaze, and staff contracts, we have failed to give enough
importance to the coming of this new world to further education.
Indeed, one of the besetting sins of the FE sector has been its failure 
to see itself as part of public sector trends, to think that its griefs are
private and its problems speciﬁc. Colleges may have student volume
targets and need to hit performance indicators for unit cost, retention
and results, but the truth is that All God’s Children Got Targets.
Prisons have targets for multi-occupied cells, suicides and escapes. 
Job Centres have targets for job placement for unemployed people,
magistrates courts and operating theatres need to get the right number
of clients through and out the other side, and (as college 16-hour students
know to their cost) Social Security clerks have targets for disqualifying
beneﬁt claimants. Police have clear-up rates, council housing depart-
ments have rental rates to hit. The population itself even has guidance
as to how many alcohol units to consume – just about the only
government target that harassed public service managers 
regularly manage to exceed.
The trend for setting targets has not escaped the attention of the media:
Apart from well publicised targets such as reductions in hospital
waiting lists and the size of infant classes, precise performance
targets have now been laid down for everything from the state 
of soldiers’ and sailors’ teeth to the number of specimens to 
be gathered by the Botanic Gardens at Kew.
Sunday Times, 13 February 2000
We now learn that the Treasury is setting targets for other departments
as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review – and setting them at
very detailed levels, looking for them to justify sums of money at the
£10m level. Cash will be reclaimed from central government departments
58 The new learning marketwho do not hit their own targets. So the Treasury sets targets for the
DfEE which sets them to the FEFC which sets them for colleges who
set them for their own schools and faculties who set them for course
managers. Targets, like Jonathan Swift’s ﬂeas, go on ad inﬁnitum.
The attraction of performance indicators
The logic is pretty simple: public services – training places, hospital
operations, prison custody – are a commodity like any other. They
should be purchased for the public in a way that delivers value for
money. Value for money is best assessed if we specify and then measure
what we expect to get for our money. The agency approach can also be
argued to get round some other problems. One was what had become
known as ‘producer capture’ in which public services got to be run for
the convenience of their staff rather than their users. Another was the
way that power had been in the hands of local government or 
amateur committees rather than expert managers. 
The advantages of performance indicators to those charged with
running the agency centred, but still massively complex and expensive
public service are obvious. Firstly, performance indicators can be seen
as part of an attempt to increase customer focus and improve quality
(Ghobadian and Ashworth, 1994). How quickly are patients being seen?
Which schools are getting the best results? Secondly, performance indi-
cators can be used to help focus effort on matters of strategic importance.
The attraction for politicians of a well-designed performance review
system lies in its power to operationalise manifesto commitments. 
By extension, performance measurement is consistent with the Govern-
ment’s desire for greater accountability. It can apparently increase control
over decentralised activities and (one step further again) help with the
management of compulsory competitive tendering. To the extent that
they inform administrative judgements about relative institutional
performance, they can create a quasi-competitive market as funding
agencies can select more effective and lower cost providers. 
At its best, analysis of valid numbers can be used to tell a prag-
matic government which policies appear able to deliver their goals. 
The danger is that it can be also used uncritically to justify cuts in
public spending. It is always possible to ﬁnd one hospital, one college
or one police service that can achieve benchmark results at low cost.
‘Calling for efﬁciency improvements through the better management 
of performance allowed the Government to cut public expenditure
without necessarily advocating or, more signiﬁcantly, being seen to
advocate service level depletion, a process facilitated by the politically
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concept of value for money without seeming to advocate or at 
least defend waste and inefﬁciency’ (Ball and Monaghan, 1996).
And whilst we are wading in the muddy waters of cynicism, let’s not
forget one last advantage of agency/PI management to a politician – the
diversion of blame. David Blunkett’s promise to resign if the national
learning targets are missed is not only courageous, it is rare. The logic
nowadays is different; it goes like this – the Government has chosen 
the goals – safe railways, making absent parents pay, high school
standards. They’ve given clear orders and handed over the cash with
the task. Failure must therefore be due to an incompetent agency that
has fallen down on the job. When a dangerous prisoner escapes, 
or a train crashes, ministers no longer resign – they call in the 
head of the Prisons Agency or Railtrack for a dressing down.
The problems with performance indicators
For whatever reason, and of whatever type, the march of the performance
indicators was irresistible, despite evidence of substantial problems in
their usefulness. It may be worth reviewing these problems systematically.
Social factors: We spotted early on that the targets and league tables
were weak in allowing for social factors. Of course there was in the past
some indefensible justiﬁcation of poor provision on social grounds.
David Blunkett once memorably told me, when he was leader of
Shefﬁeld Council and I was opening a new college in his ward: 
‘I don’t want you coming back in two years and telling me the results are
rubbish because everyone’s disadvantaged.’ We must make educational
success available to all students, whatever their background: the energy
the Government is giving to this task is heartening. But one of the most
secure ﬁndings of educational research remains the link between social
class and attainment. Judgements that make no allowance for context
let the schools in the suburbs off easy, and leave the inner city school
(and for that matter police force or rent ofﬁce) demoralised. The ﬁrst
performance tables for New Deal job placement success placed 10 of the
15 ‘best performing’ New Deal areas in rural Scotland, and 15 of the 20
‘worst performing’ in inner London. Lambeth was placed 119th out 
of 144 in its performance. 
For as long as social inclusion is part of the public policy agenda, 
we must get this measure of achievement against the grain right. 
The problem is knowing how much of a discount is appropriate.
Bradford will never match the primary school attainment levels 
of Kingston-upon-Thames, but what levels should be expected?
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an important task for the research community. In the meantime,
benchmarks may be better than league tables. As soon as the idea of
‘clustering’ results in comparable areas was introduced, Lambeth’s 
New Deal job placement score rose to 2nd out of 17.
Creaming: The damage from ignoring context could be worse than
inappropriate judgements of quality, as managers alter their institutional
policies to look good. Economists looking at planning systems note that
‘creaming’ is encouraged, where easier targets or clients are given prefer-
ences over more difﬁcult (and often more deserving) cases. It would be
sad if those working on the toughest tasks chose to ignore difﬁcult to
place trainees, or students with unsuccessful secondary backgrounds.1
OECD (1988) has found creaming to be widespread in training
schemes across the world. It is already happening in one crucial area
outside education, where I predicted last year that publicly comparing
hospital mortality rates will lead to a reluctance to treat – or even admit –
seriously ill patients. The Independent duly reported on 7 September
1999 that ‘The Chief Executive of a London teaching hospital has
warned that surgeons could refuse to operate on high-risk patients 
if the emphasis on success rates for individual doctors increased’.
Measuring the wrong things: Those collecting performance
indicators sometimes ask for numbers that don’t actually measure what
they want to know. Sometimes it is because we are measuring what 
is easy, not what matters. The most fatuous example is judging local
government responsiveness by how quickly phones are answered: 
an unhelpful response after three rings scores better than solving 
the problem after four.2 Reliance on ﬁxed census dates make college
retention measures very sensitive to the date a course starts. A more
important example from the FE world is the very poor collection of
destination data. This must be the paramount indicator of success for
an educational institution – are people in jobs, earning more money,
off drugs, staying out of jail, living independently? It would answer 
the Government’s proper desire for outcomes, not outputs. Yet because
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1. Note the increasing exclusion of difﬁcult pupils from schools – which rose 500% 
between 1990/91 and 1995/96. They get in the way of how we currently measure 
raising standards and have to go.
2. Another ‘measuring the wrong things’ story: an angry MP demanded to know why her 
local education authority was at the bottom of the league for drawing down funds for
nursery places, for eliminating outside toilets in primary schools, and in school maintenance
grants. The reason is that (a) it has 120% coverage of nursery places and needs no more 
(b) it replaced outside toilets twenty years ago (c) the school buildings have been well
maintained and require little remedial work. Far from being the sign of a bad LEA, 
the league position was a mark of honour.it is expensive and difﬁcult to collect, quality information 
(outside the sixth form college sector) is rarely available.3
Data quality: Even when the measure is right, apparent differences 
in institutional performance may just show variations in ability to
collect data: Lambeth College’s declared pass rate is twice that of some
comparable inner London colleges, but I don’t think we are twice as good.
Alternatively, differences may arise from different methods of managing
data. The number of rail complaints fell when railway companies made
forms more difﬁcult to obtain: the number of sexual crimes reported rose
when police took a more sympathetic attitude to victims. The problem
is worse when information is unrelated to incentives or judgements of
performance: managers only put resource into result areas. The old FE
Annual Monitoring Survey was held in contempt by people who had
better things to do: and sending nonsense data to head ofﬁce is not
unknown in other sectors. The way that agencies now get round this is
to tag resource to data: this gives providers an incentive to get data in,
and allows audit to perform a dual function of monitoring performance
alongside its traditional role of assuring probity. The problem is that 
it also gives institutions ﬁnancial incentives to massage the ﬁgures. 
Fiddling the books: This rarely comes to out-and-out fraud, 
though that certainly happens.4 If there are ﬁnancial penalties for
student drop-out, there will be colleges who claim 100% retention. 
If you only get paid for a piece of adult training if the trainee gets 
a job or passes an NVQ, then those job outcomes or qualiﬁcations 
will appear. It is a lucky TEC that is not carrying a provision in its
accounts against past fraud. I’ll move to further education shortly, 
but here are a few interesting cases reported in the press:
  In the US, the reputation of some well regarded ‘zero-tolerance’
police chiefs has fallen as it has been found that their impressive
ﬁgures were the result of distortions and misreporting as crimes
were either unreported or downgraded. Car theft became vandalism,
burglary was lost property – all to ensure the serious crime rate fell
and the detection rate rose.5
  Privatised rail operators have extended the times for journeys 
to make it easier to avoid penalties on their punctuality targets.
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3. Perhaps we should take a leaf out of the book of the American National 
Foundation for the Teaching of Entrepreneurship. They used a private eye 
to track down alumni of their inner-city owner-manager programmes!
4. Stories of Welsh primary schools who over-claimed pupils, or doctors with 
implausible patient lists both surfaced during the preparation of this paper.
5. Independent on Sunday, 19 October 1998.  A city in China caused alarm for environmental health ofﬁcials
when it reported many more mentally handicapped children 
than expected. On investigation, it turned out that the local school
system, realising that students with special needs could be left out 
of league tables, classiﬁed all who stood little chance of a pass 
as disabled. Some of the kids moved to other school districts 
and did very well.
  New York schools were discovered, according to the Independent
(9 December 1999) to be routinely falsifying the tests that show
pupil progress, in order to look good in government tables 
and attract extra funding.
‘The more any social indicator is used for social decision making, the
greater the corruption pressures upon it.’ (Campbell, 1979). And it’s
not just social policy. Major errors in the US Army’s ofﬁcial estimates
of Vietcong numbers (which ignored guerrillas, supporters and anyone
not in military uniform) were covered up to make it appear that the US
was winning (Adams, 1995). Agency theory shows how monitoring is
needed where there are ‘hidden actions’ or ‘information asymmetries’
which expose principals to ‘moral hazards’ or ‘adverse selection’ 
(Wallace 1980). But monitoring is rarely deep or clever enough. 
It didn’t catch Robert Maxwell or Nick Leeson, BCCI or 
Halton College – or General Westmoreland.
Proxy padding: More common than straight dishonesty is tariff
farming. Colleges short of units enter a whole cohort for additional
qualiﬁcations: all the A-level language students do Institute of Linguists
courses, all the art & design students do RSA CLAIT.6 The franchise
scam, where colleges bought growth rates of up to and above 100% 
by badging existing students from private trainers or proﬁtable
companies, is another aspect of this. Again, colleges have a huge
ﬁnancial disincentive to classify a student as having left, and so the 
FE league tables show implausibly high retention rates alongside
implausibly low achievement rates.7 This is all horribly well known 
to economists, who speak of Goodhart’s Law which postulates ‘that
any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure 
is placed upon it for control purposes’ (Goodhart, 1975).
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6. In the TEC world, the number of NVQs per trainee can be boosted by putting able
apprentices in for a number of awards – NVQ1, NVQ2 and NVQ3 shortly after one another.
7. For example, reported retention for colleges in deprived areas on NVQ3 level courses is 75%,
with pass rates at 57%. Give me a break. There is another reason for reported achievement
being lower than actual – namely the difﬁculty of collecting results from many examination
boards for a transient adult student population. But if the funding methodology favoured
results ahead of retention…The result is that the published performance indicators rarely provide
sound evidence of underlying real performance8 – unless we are talking
about the performance of nimble minds in the management information
industry. As a leading FE Principal once said: ‘They want units, I’ll give 
’em units’. This is well known in the literature of central planning. Gray
(1997) uses the example of the ‘production fetishism’ of the Soviet planning
system to illustrate the ‘gaming’ effects of output monitoring. In Russia,
for example, production targets encouraged over-production of poor
quality goods. When targets for glass production were deﬁned in tons,
the factory had an incentive to produce undesirably thick glass, but
when targets changed to square metres the glass was made too thin. 
The problem is that in the absence of a real market, and unwilling 
to trust public servants, funding agencies have to look for proxies to
measure: this is where much of the distortion comes in. They can’t
measure efﬁcient health care, so they measure the length and duration
of the waiting list. So hospitals concentrate on procedures that reduce
waiting lists rather than medical need. They can’t measure a good
education, so they have to rate schools on whether they get pupils to
ﬁve grade Cs at GCSE. Performance of the lower ability cohort then
falls as schools concentrate resources only on those likely to get to 
that level. TECs are in the same dilemma. Having to hit their MPLs – 
‘minimum performance levels’ – measured as so many NVQs or training
places, they are under great temptation to provide the qualiﬁcations
and courses that will tick the box: short, low level, cheap – rather 
than those the economy needs: long, high-level, costly.
Closer to home, the recent expansion in further education of ﬁrst-
aid and food hygiene courses is not because the economy needs them,
but because the price FEFC used to pay for them offered such a good
proﬁt margin. The FEFC’s line is now to say that the funding system was
ﬁne, but it was knocked off course by the unexpected entrepreneurialism
of the FE sector. They should have known better. ‘The central ideas 
of economic theory are very simple. They boil down to little more 
than the proposition that people will usually take advantage of
opportunities…’ (Krugman, 1999). 
Outcomes not process: This would all be an amusing game were 
it not for the fact that resources are diverted into activities that yield
good indicators and away from those that don’t ﬁt. A construction
training centre shut last year in Camberwell because TECs are obliged
by their funding regime to hold back 75% of the money until trainees
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8. FEFC inspectors rarely believe the published PIs and always 
send in a statistical hit squad before inspection.have a steady job: but in the low end of building trades, jobs are rarely
28 consecutive days,9 so the trainers can’t get paid. An American example,
and maybe not totally ﬁctional, is to be found in Michael Connolly’s
wonderful Harry Bosch books, which feature the contempt of our
ﬂawed but decent hero for the ‘number squads’ who exist to give the
LA Police Department impressive arrest and clear-up rates for public
consumption, irrespective of real work or serious criminals.
Short-term v. long term: There becomes an emphasis on outputs
rather than process, doing the minimum to get by. ‘Innovation involves
risk and risk is not rewarded.’ (Soviet quote in Gray, 1997). Projects with
a quick payoff will tend to be preferred in a system which needs to prove
the value of the current year’s expenditure by achievements before year-
end. Trainers ﬁnanced by NVQ aim for fast turnaround whilst the broad
skills we need to develop for the new employment world are likely to be a
casualty of a number driven system. Sixth form college staff lamented
the passing of the entitlement curriculum as the qualiﬁcation driven
funding and quality assessment system drove down teaching hours.
Inner city colleges found that innovative courses aimed at rescuing the
young disaffected might take people off beneﬁt and build conﬁdence –
but they certainly have retention and achievement rates below approved
benchmarks. A stark illustration of the pull between PIs v. innovation
can be expressed in a single question – what will be the retention and
achievement statistics of the Uﬁ/learndirect? 
The tension between short-term indicators and long term improvement
is particularly acute in the school sector. One of Lambeth College’s
partner schools is a tough, but improving, secondary in the north of
the borough. It has, this year, for the ﬁrst time attracted a full intake 
of local 11 year olds: but it will be ﬁve years before this is reﬂected 
in its GCSE league table performance – time enough for the local
community to take fright at the poor PIs, send its children elsewhere,
and turn the cycle downwards again.
Paying the cost: Another great disadvantage of the new wisdom 
is cost. The army of administrators and auditors needed by the new
management system must be paid for before any efﬁciency gain can 
be claimed. This is a hidden cost, skimmed from education budgets. 
It should worry a government aiming to ‘ensure the money reaches the
learner rather than being tied up in administration’ (DfEE Press Release,
29 October 1999). We have eight management information staff at
Lambeth, collecting and checking information for the Funding Council:
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9. The reason for this is that when a job outcome was deﬁned (and paid) after seven days,
numerous scams happened. Again, the difﬁculties of establishing a quasi-market come to the fore.this is a comparatively modest set-up for a college our size.10
One London TEC spent nearly £1m last year on extra accountancy
staff to ensure it was compliant with Government Ofﬁce requirements.
Even then, it is likely that different auditors will have different inter-
pretations, making comparisons based on their approved data ﬂawed.11
What is ironic, as we have noted earlier, is that compliance auditing of
this sort is not good at uncovering fraud, which almost always comes
to light in other ways.12 Just as wags sometimes ask why there is only
one Monopolies Commission, perhaps we should ask where is the
value for money in audit.
It cannot be just the institutions who are paying the cost: the agencies
are also running to stand still. TECs have existed for 10 years, yet last
year – between April and October – there were 22 supplementary changes
to their ﬁnancial agreements with Government Ofﬁces. Incorporation
happened in 1993. The FEFC has already published almost 400 Circulars
and the pace does not slacken: the number of circulars issued has increased
in each of the last four years and they now come more or less weekly.
This is not a criticism of the Council or its staff: I believe that if we
want to run a system via the target and audit culture it will indeed
require this sort of detail.13
Distorting the managerial task: What institutional managers have
to do in a world of audit and target and performance indicators and
league tables is comply.14 Local discretion – the style of the college plan,
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10. David Eade, a respected Principal at Barnsley, estimates that his college – 
famously efﬁcient and lean – spends £1m a year on collecting and providing 
management information for funding agencies.
11. Therefore more guidance is needed – and tirelessly supplied – for auditors. Colleges framing
their self-assessment reports on their audit quality will be helped by the FEFC’s list of no fewer
than 119 points to check. A similar picture is to be found in equal opportunity, where a college
filling out the FEDA good practice check will ﬁnd itself printing off upwards of 50 pages.
12. In a tragic recent example, the Bristol baby heart operation scandal was unveiled 
by a whistleblower, not by analysis of PIs.
13. An interesting interchange from the PAC investigation into Halton College (26 April 1999): 
‘(Mr Twigg) Does it concern you that since 1992 roughly 400 circulars plus have been sent to
colleges, many of them relating to ﬁnancial regulations, audits, ﬁnancial matters and yet we
are still seeing the problems we are looking at today in terms of Bilston, in terms of Halton
and you may be aware that today we have heard on the news about Wirral College and
major problems with overspending there. Is it not the case that the quantity of advice 
from the FEFC has not been matched by the quality? (Mr Bichard) We should always 
be concerned at the amount of advice which is going out both to colleges and to schools. 
We have, however, been going through the establishment of a new sector, we have been
setting up new funding arrangements, we have had need to offer an enormous amount of
guidance to colleges through the FEFC so I am not surprised at the amount which is going
out. We should always be concerned about the quality and the clarity of that advice.’
14. The new managerial wisdom is strikingly like the ways we use to manage our own 
poor performers in-house – setting clear goals and targets and checking all the time. 
This gives a clue to how much the policy makers now trust the public servants below them.the length of the New Deal Gateway – is limited. It is not that responding
to the agency above you gets in the way of the job – it becomes the job.
Staff meetings are given over to explaining to bafﬂed teachers and
technicians why we have to comply. Management information is 
shaped to give the agency what it wants, not managers what they want.15
Each new Circular must be scrutinised for its effect on the college. 
In the longer term, a generation of managers comes through who see the
whole job as responding to head ofﬁce. Initiative and ﬂair, local respon-
siveness and job satisfaction will ebb away until we get to the point of
complaining, with Inspector Truscott in Orton’s play Loot: ‘how dare
you involve me in a situation for which no memo has been issued!’
This has already happened in the TECs. Impressive senior industrialists
have been recruited to their boards. But rather than discuss the training
and skills needs of the region or industries they know about, they concen-
trate on the latest number of adult starts, cash reserves and performance
levels. What the whole movement was set up for has been lost in a fog
of targets and indicators. In a huge irony, the attempt to introduce 
the market ends in Stalinism.
How it works in post-16 education and training
The world of indicators and targets came to further education soon
after incorporation. The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act
established a Further Education Funding Council, and took nearly 
500 colleges out of local government control. This was presented at 
the time as liberating colleges to be more entrepreneurial and ﬂexible:
at a famous reception, John Major asked the assembled Principals 
and Chairs: ‘Isn’t it great to be free?’.
We soon discovered we were about as free as a Marks and Spencer
shirt supplier. Our liberation was quickly followed by the need to share
Strategic Plans on a common format, to break that plan down into 
lists of actions by whom and by when, to make detailed returns to 
the Funding Council three times a year, and to hit ever more demanding
targets of growth, unit cost and achievement. A new funding system was
introduced based on breaking all our work down into units: a college’s
unit earnings depended on not only its student numbers, but its pro-
gramme mix, its ability to raise fee income, its record in retention 
and achievement, how much learning or childcare support its students
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15. A classic example of this is the absence of any workable electronic register system that counts
student attendance. Colleges are actually worse at this than they were in the early ’90s.needed and more recently how many low income students it attracted.16
League tables were established, with six major indicators17 taking 
pride of place:
1. Achieving the funding target: Each year colleges are set targets 
for their activity in the coming year, based on student enrolments,
additional learning support and so on. By seeing how close we get
to our funding target, the FEFC judges the effectiveness of our
planning and target setting.
2. Student enrolment trends: The FEFC looks also at how fast
enrolments are growing (or falling). This shows them if colleges 
are providing programmes that meet the needs of students.
3. Student continuation: The proportion of enrolled students who
are still attending in the summer term to show the appropriateness
as well as effectiveness of learning programmes. 
4. Student achievements: The percentage of completing students 
who attained their main learning goal is used to provide an
indicator of student achievements. 
5. Attainment of NVQs: The FEFC needed to know the numbers 
of young people achieving NVQ2 and NVQ3 and the number of
adults achieving NVQ3 or higher in order to see how the college 
is contributing to meeting the national targets for education and
training. It is difﬁcult to see what this indicator adds to PI2 and
PI4 apart from a marketing device for the NVQ sacred cow.
6. Average level of funding (ALF): Measuring the college’s cost-
efﬁciency measured as the amount of cash per unit. This has been
abandoned – ostensibly because unit cost is now determined
centrally according to convergence tram-lines, but possibly 
because of the known ﬂaws in its calculation.
These are the headline indicators, but others have also come into play.
Assessments of quality routinely use the number of lessons graded
satisfactory or better during inspection visits, or the number of colleges
with management that is less than satisfactory. Financial assessments
quote the proportion of colleges that achieve grade A status – meaning
that the evidently have the resources to achieve their business plans.
Interestingly, other sectors of the public training worlds have
different indicators. TECs have eight ‘minimum performance levels’
(MPLs) in total, measured at the mid-year and end-year points. 
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16. Following the report of the Kennedy Committee, premium payments 
are now made for students from deprived areas.
17. See FEFC Circular 94/31. Yes, it is that long ago.The MPLs are:
  Youth starts
  Youth output points
  Modern Apprenticeships ethnic minority starts
  Basic Employability (BE) starts
  BE output points
  Adult jobs/self employment
  Adult ethnic minority outcomes
  IIP recognitions for organisations with 10 or more employees.
Although these ﬁgures are arranged in league tables by the DfEE, 
they are essentially thresholds – not absolute values. And not only 
is the style of indicators different: so is the use to which they are put.
There is no pass or fail mark in the FEFC indicators, nor is there any
apparent adverse consequence of performing poorly.18 Indeed, a bad
enough performance will bring a generous Standards Fund cheque
ﬂopping onto your college welcome mat. By contrast, a TEC that 
falls short of its mid-year or end-year minimum performance levels 
will ﬁnd that the regional government ofﬁce reduces its managerial
freedom signiﬁcantly – in particular, the ability to vire between
programmes. The idea of using minimum performance levels as a
licence to trade19 as an educational supplier might be attractive to an
agency keen to ensure low entry barriers but anxious about quality.
The existence of differing targets and performance levels in similar
programmes places interesting choices to managers, who often have to
deal with clients from different agencies doing the same course. Take the
case of an FE college with European and FEFC funding. To avoid double-
funding, FEFC students are discounted when put forward for ESF funding.
As a result, managers are often faced with a choice at the end of the year
as to which agency’s targets to hit – FEFC or regional Government Ofﬁce.
It could also be argued that there are internal tensions between perform-
ance indicators – for example between high retention and high achieve-
ment (early leavers are likely to be students struggling with the course)
or between standards and widening participation. This makes the 
FE manager’s job – and maybe our analysis of their behaviour – 
like the idea of ‘satisﬁcing’ found in the theory of the ﬁrm.
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18. There are only two I can think of. One is the compulsion for a college in ﬁnancial 
category C to agree a rescue plan with the FEFC; and there is a ‘slap on the wrist’ 
for colleges getting unsatisfactory inspection grades in that they may not expand 
areas of poor provision until improvement is conﬁrmed by re-inspection.
19. A bit like allowing clubs to enter the Football League when their ground safety 
is up to scratch? Or requiring contractors to follow building regulations?So what should we do?
None of this is to deny that we need good performance indicators. 
It does matter that a child is three times more likely to die in the same
heart operation in a hospital in Bristol than in one in Birmingham. We
still need the numbers to inform judgements on effectiveness, value for
money, ﬂexibility, and quality. No one wants to go back to a sluggish
public sector of council estates and sink schools. But when creating a
new post-16 education and training world, we must acknowledge the
weaknesses of the measures we have used to judge the workings of 
the system we inherit. We need to blend the best of agency PI world
with the best of the traditional public sector in (I hesitantly suggest) 
a third way. I suggest below that we need to take three decisions:
  Make sure the numbers are clean and useful for managers – deﬁned in
terms that make sense to those compiling them and those using them
  Supplement them with research and evaluation 
to a much greater degree than at the moment
  Use them to develop effective long-term purchaser-supplier
relationships, rather than as headlines for political and public use.
Performance indicator gaming is a consequence of poor communi-
cation and mistrust, that can be avoided by engendering a sense 
of common effort.
Clean up the numbers: Our ﬁrst task is to make the numbers collected
useful for judgements to be made. We are talking about the 3 Ds:
  The dimension – the aspect of performance that the manager or
agency wants to know about (local government responsiveness,
college student wastage)
  The deﬁnition – how the dimension is to be captured (how quickly
the phone is answered, whether an enrolled student is still on course)
  The data – giving precise instructions to those collecting the
information, which may involve proxies or cut-off dates, closeness
to prescribed target levels or whatever (how many calls were or were
not answered inside four rings; students in class after 1 May as a
percentage of those enrolled on 1 November).
All three need to be right to get meaningful ﬁgures – but even so they
would still leave the problems of context and gaming I mentioned earlier.
My recommendations would therefore include:
  Develop a suite of performance indicators that measure what is
important – skills gaps; social inclusion; value added; perhaps even
changes in local output – not what is easy. Recognise that some of these
70 The new learning marketrequire years to assess: for example, were access students successful
in graduating? Did Business Start courses create enduring SMEs? Has
that single parent stayed off beneﬁt? Recognise too that judgements
of college performance will need to be made using the suite, not by
what Charles Handy described as the ‘tyranny of the single number’.
  Ensure that targets and performance indicators have a social context,
a carefully considered ‘degree of difﬁculty’ rating. Don’t compare
intensive care with general wards. Cluster providers in families for
comparison. To be fair, this is now recognised by New Deal and
more grudgingly by the FEFC. 
  Develop some partnership goals and targets that have to be achieved
by teams of institutions working together. This is already in place in
learning partnership plans, and needs to be developed to full usefulness.
  Remove any perverse incentives. Scoring schools on their average
grade rather than their number of students with ﬁve Cs will encourage
raising achievement across the board. Funding franchised work 
with employers at the actual contract cost will support partnerships 
that make educational sense, whilst offering nothing to the 
‘fast buck merchants’.
  Keep stability between years – don’t keep ducking and diving. 
The better understood a PI is, the easier providers will ﬁnd it to 
give good ﬁgures, and the cuter auditors will be to spot malpractice.
FEFC retention and achievement ﬁgures are now tip-toeing towards
usefulness – but after four years of noise and nonsense. This implies
running indicators as pilots for a number of years before publication –
a promise that was broken in primary school tests. With 2000 or more
providers, we cannot afford to jump around with different measures
of quality or value for money from year to year.
  Measure what you want to manage not proxies – for example,
satisﬁed callers not phone rings, students not funding units.20
  Make sure that ﬁgures are comparable across sectors – for example,
that school and college data for retention and exam success are
measured the same way (which they currently aren’t).
  We must have some input measures as well as output measures – 
e.g. PCs per student, teaching hours, number of student counsellors
per full-time student. The period of hygiene that moved institutions
away from judging quality only in terms of inputs – carpets in 
the classrooms, how many teachers, how many library books – 
was useful, but we need to move on. 
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20. Between 1990 and 1993, college funding was based on FTE students. 
Enrolments boomed. From 1994 onwards, it was based on funding units. 
Unit totals boomed, but actual student growth slowed to a crawl.  Ensure that performance indicators are compatible with internal
target setting (unlike the FEFC’s current practice in results, for
example). Thus, managers will have an incentive to ensure the
numbers are accurate for their own purposes: it will also minimise
cost. Further, providers should be encouraged to develop their own
performance indicators for the areas of concern to them, and share
them with colleagues. (It strikes me that the source of the ‘gaming’
problem is that performance indicators were initially devised 
for internal management use – the corruption came when they
became used by external bodies for control.)
  Even after all this, view the ﬁgures with very great circumspection.
They could be used to inform the decision about collecting more
information – for example, which colleges are ready for their next
inspection. However, as Einstein is alleged to have said, ‘not everything
that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted
counts’. Users of data need to know the limitations involved in
collection and behaviour lower down the ‘food chain’.
Evaluation and research: It is often said that further education has 
a poor research base. This is no longer true; but it is the case that
further education makes little use of research ﬁndings for policy
choices. Alongside a suite of reliable performance indicators we 
must build longer term evaluation – measuring the success of differing
approaches in reducing drop-out, achieving progression to higher level
courses, success in higher education and employment, ﬁnding out who
is in work and what they earn. Long-term research is needed: an Access
course may have good results and retention, but do its graduates make
it through higher education? A training programme may be low cost,
but are the clients still as likely to be unemployed three or ﬁve years
later? A national programme needs to be coordinated that will link
strong research with purposeful dissemination: FEDA seems well
placed to take this role.
Rebuilding a public service
Performance indicators may be conﬁgured this way and that, or ﬁddled
one way or another, and research ﬁndings may support or criticise
current practice. The most important question to ask about them is:
‘so what?’. The point, as Karl Marx once remarked, is not to interpret
the world but to change it. What do we want PIs for? I would argue that
the most proﬁtable use would be to inform the long-term relationship
between the Learning and Skills Councils, and the providers. 
72 The new learning marketThe voice of many evaluators lies behind the view that
performance indicators should be used within a developmental
rather than an accountability approach. Performance indicators
should be used as ‘guides, not answers’, as ‘tin-openers’ rather
than ‘the dials on the dashboard of a car’, for ‘systematic
thinking, rather than the rigorous allocation of blame’, 
for ‘learning rather than control’ Jackson, 1998
Building the partnership: But this implies that there is a long-term relation-
ship. In my view, it is essential that we commit ourselves to developing
a quality infrastructure through time. The UK skills problem is long
term and deep seated. Our problems of technical education have been
noted by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall: the 1884 Royal Commission
was established to look into the problem. The Professor of Social
Economics at LSE wrote illuminatingly on the subject as it faced the
Macmillan government (Williams, 1963). There are no quick ﬁxes.
Skills gaps and social exclusion will only be addressed if we regard 
the existence of strong institutions in vocational education as being as
important as it is in the university sector, in hospitals or in the private
schools. We must stop regarding colleges as just ‘suppliers’, in some
way part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
Stability and continuity are essential for success. No-one will invest
in expensive equipment or new buildings if they are likely to lose a
contract in a year or so. Allocating high volume courses to the cheapest
provider will not help, either. Specialist and high level provision feeds
off general high volume courses: selling low level carpentry courses 
to the lowest bid imperils stone-masonry or stained glass. Expertise 
in meeting the needs of the disaffected, or ways to challenge the most
able, are built over time on the basis of commitment to a community.
The collaborative local system implied by Learning Partnerships cannot
work without stability of institutions – and lifelong learning will be
strengthened if the college is still there when people come back to it.
This is not an easy way out: I have found in my own job that some stability
is required to chase down quality and cost issues. Real improvement 
is a slow, slogging process. Dramatic changes in PIs/targets are either
fraudulent or recovery from dreadfulness.
An FE principal arguing for stability and continuity could be seen 
as self-serving, but it is nevertheless important. Change in the public
sector can be swifter than in markets. Colleges have been effective 
in responding to secular change – the collapse of apprenticeship, 
the decline of manufacturing and mining, the feminisation 
of the workforce, the coming of information technologies. 
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in government priorities. Policy is bound to be capricious – whatever
happened to Regional Advisory Councils, the Education Reform Act,
ET, NAFE planning, the ILEA, polytechnics, the MSC, WRFE, grant-
maintained schools, the demand-related element, TECs? There is even
a good case for saying that strategic planning in the public sector, 
as currently conﬁgured, is an impossibility. By contrast, institutional
continuity is greater in capitalist markets than in the public sector. 
The dominant ﬁrms, with some exceptions like Microsoft, have been
around for decades, sometimes more. The moral in the public sector 
is to presume in favour of continuity.
Empower the providers: Then we must loosen up the control freak
culture. There must be greater freedom to approach problems in new ways.
This calls for a removal of in-year funding penalties (so colleges can
‘fail forward’ without immediate ﬁnancial punishment). The power of
local LSCs to deliver a part of the budget outside the funding tariff must
be used to support imaginative initiatives that hit government goals –
reaching out to the disaffected, establishing connections between training
and work, and launching programmes that do not ﬁt conventional
qualiﬁcation aims. This must be managed in a way different to the
existing reliance on challenge bids, enabling those delivering the service
to develop ideas of what works on the ground. I would argue for budgets
based on agreed plans, not in-year achievement. This would add purpose
and interest to the preparation of Strategic Plans. Working like that
will also have some chance of restoring the morale of workers in the
public sector, whose enthusiasm and commitment has held much
together over the difﬁculties in recent years.
The argument for continuity and freedom is not a soft option, nor 
is it hostile to the idea of developing a new learning market. Capitalism
has moved on. The relationship between supplier and provider in the
advanced private sector is no longer one of ‘open outcry’, or ‘stack it
high and sell it cheap’. In today’s knowledge economy, companies learn
together. Supply chains are built carefully through time. Business partners
are involved in new designs, in developing new products. This is not to say
that buyers do not demand efﬁciency and quality from their suppliers –
nor that they sometimes choose to drop a supplier altogether. Indeed, it
can be argued that the growth of performance indicators and the audit
culture is because of agencies’ reluctance to let public institutions die. 
As Julian Gravatt, the percipient Registrar at Lewisham College has
remarked, one cannot argue for an economy of strong public institutions
whilst sheltering every weak one. Perhaps the Faustian bargain for the
next stage of post-16 development is looser control for less security. 
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really happening in modern capitalism, the audit culture is dissonant
not only with any idea of well-regulated professionalism, but also 
with modern management theory. Glance down Deming’s famous 
14 points – ‘drive out fear’, ‘constancy of purpose’, ‘eliminate arbitrary
numerical measures’ – and see how many ﬁt the compliance world.
Crude ideas of ‘producer–provider separation’, a false dichotomy
between the interests of learners and those of colleges, and illusions
that indicators exist which can give clean snapshots of performance
will lead to more systems combining the worst aspects of markets –
uncertainty and lack of accountability – with the inﬂexibility and
bureaucracy of planning. They arise from an outdated model of how
modern markets are now conﬁgured, and will leave policy makers and
their servants, like unsuccessful generals, ﬁghting the previous war.
Conclusion
When I started this line of enquiry, I thought it was an interesting
backwater that might be good for a few gags. Over the past couple of
months, I’ve come to another view – that this is actually a very important
topic. Discussions with interested colleagues in and outside education
have indicated that ﬁgures are much less reliable, and gaming much
more common, than is realised by the makers of high policy. 
But the topic goes deeper than that, and asks what is the difference
between public and private endeavours? How do we judge how well
we are reaching our public goals? How can we balance the need for 
a stable development of public institutions against complacency and
poor quality. This is not a trivial matter, and there are no clear answers.
It is my view that time will show that the bean-counters have led us up
a cul-de-sac. The way forward must involve regenerating the support
and enthusiasm of those delivering public services to the purpose of
genuinely improved performance and efﬁciency. But we cannot avoid 
a difﬁcult journey towards a re-invented public sector.
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76 The new learning marketW
hat is the problem that the post-16 White Paper Learning
to succeed is trying to address? This question has been
puzzling observers since the White Paper’s publication 
in June 1999. The puzzle arises because of the apparent
contrast between the clear desire to create a learning market driven 
by the needs of the learner, while at the same time having that market
overlaid by an apparently sophisticated planning apparatus.
Ostensibly the reforms appear to be a response to a number of
criticisms of the post-16 learning system which have resonance with
many observers. Firstly, there is confusion and more importantly inequity
between funding routes. The objective of having a common funding
formula is generally accepted by all interested parties, and a sign of
signiﬁcant progress is that the funding of school sixth forms will be
addressed in the same framework (DfEE, 1999b). A second critique 
is based on the argument that providers have been insufﬁciently
responsive to the needs of learners. The language of the ‘learning
market’ is meant to signal that with funding following the learner,
providers will be obliged to be more responsive. Although some
observers are put off by the language of the market, and others 
argue that further education is already fairly responsive to learners, 
the objective of ensuring that providers provide what learners want is
so obviously desirable that there can be few who would argue against
this principle. In addition a number of speciﬁc examples of ‘provider’
failure in the FE sector have raised concerns. 
If this was all there was to the White Paper (DfEE, 1999a), it is hard
to see why it would be so controversial. It would also be hard to see
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on the new learning market, 14 December 1999.why there was such an emphasis on planning, which would not really
be necessary in the form envisaged in the White Paper if the objectives
were simply to provide a system of equitable funding and to make
providers more responsive. 
However, there is another justiﬁcation lurking behind the White Paper,
which DfEE ofﬁcials have conﬁrmed is, in practice, overwhelmingly more
important than those explored in the paragraphs above. The UK economy
is held to be in a ‘low skills equilibrium’ whereby a ‘skills gap’ separates
the UK workforce from those of comparable industrial countries, with
this gap in turn the cause of inadequate economic performance –
especially in relation to the ‘productivity gap’ which is also said to
separate the UK from comparable countries. It is this concern which
drives the ‘command and control’ elements evident in the White Paper. 
What is being asserted here is not that the learning market suffers from
‘market failures’ justifying carefully targeted interventions to overcome
those failures: rather it is alleged that the education and training system
suffers from ‘systemic failures’ leading to an under-skilled UK workforce.
Researchers tell the Government that we have a skills gap and employers’
organisations constantly reinforce the message. Ergo further education
must be failing to deliver. The supply side of the learning market must 
be given a good shake-up, which is the agenda for this White Paper. 
In addition demand for learning must be stimulated, which is the 
agenda primarily for future reforms. Essentially further education 
is being blamed for the perceived problems of the British economy.
So we have a ‘learning market’ to make providers more responsive
to learners and to create equity between learning routes, and we have
‘planning’ to overcome the ‘low skills equilibrium’. The apparent contra-
diction in the White Paper is thus easily explained after all.
There is another agenda also apparent in the debate, which is the
answer to the perennial question of who will pay for additional invest-
ment in lifelong learning: the state, employers or individuals? This is the
question which has to be asked if the demand for learning is to be increased,
for this extra demand has to be paid for by someone. It is also the agenda
behind the development of individual learning accounts.
ILAs were included in the 1997 election manifesto because the
Labour Party had decided to drop some of the traditional instruments
designed to increase employer investment in training – such as some
form of levy system. However, they still needed some instrument to
signal that they were serious about tackling the perceived problem 
of low levels of investment in learning by employers. In practice, as
Stanton (1999) shows, employers are highly unlikely to put signiﬁcant
sums of money into ILAs. There is simply no incentive for them to do so.
78 The new learning marketThe State will only put ‘promises-to-pay’ into ILAs, which will be
honoured when individuals sign up for courses. This would be little
different in practice from the system which we now have and will be
developed further as the proposals in the White Paper are implemented.
So we are left with ILAs as a vehicle for increased individual contri-
butions, though why individuals should want to lock up resources 
in an ILA rather than the cash element of an ISA is unclear, as 
Stanton (1999) notes.
The Government is unclear which individuals ILAs are aimed at.
Some clarity in this debate can be arrived at by applying the Government’s
model for the reform of pensions. Most high earners have access to existing
occupational and personal private pensions. Stakeholder pensions are
a lower cost form of personal private pension for those on between half
and average earnings. For those on low incomes – less than half average
earnings – the State will fund people’s pensions. ILAs are presumably
aimed at the same group stakeholder pensions are aimed at – those 
in the middle reaches of the labour market. But if individuals on low
incomes are not expected to contribute to private funded pensions,
then they can hardly be expected to pay for their learning either. 
Behind all of this activity on ILAs is an assumption that the demand
for learning is being held back by ﬁnancial or capital market constraints.
So although the assertion of a ‘systemic failure’ lies behind government
strategy, the ﬂagship policy response actually seems to be related to one
of the well-rehearsed market failures. Indeed, in the prospectus for the
Learning and Skills Council (DfEE, 1999c) ILAs are mentioned only
once as helping people to overcome ‘…the ﬁnancial barriers to learning’.
This document makes no mention of the role ILAs are supposed to play
in helping to change the ‘culture’ around lifelong learning. If the DfEE
does have a clever two-stage strategy for a ‘revolution’ in lifelong
learning, the documentation around the setting up of the Council 
does not reveal much revolutionary intention.
It has yet to be demonstrated that ILAs can ‘empower’ holders, or that
they will be the key to unlocking pent-up demand for access to courses
while ensuring that holders bear a signiﬁcant part of the cost themselves.
Some learners face practical barriers to learning in terms of the need to
care for dependants or to access affordable public transport, though the
practical policy response to these problem could easily lie in an alternative
set of policy instruments. ILAs also seem to be based on a view of the
learner as an individual purchaser, denying the importance of the
‘social capital’, or indeed just the quality of experience which can 
be offered to an individual by a vibrant and stable institution 
able to rely on some continuity of funding.
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to learners in further education. Note, however, that an unstated but
implicit objective for the introduction of such loans in higher education
was to damp down demand for higher education below what it would
otherwise have been. This is the inevitable consequence of getting individ-
uals to bear more of the cost of learning, which is exactly equivalent to
raising the price of learning. In further education, the introduction of
loans for adults who have previously not had access to public funds would
remove an inequity and might lead to an increase in the demand for
learning, though by how much is uncertain. It is not clear what aims
will be achieved by introducing either ILAs or income contingent loans
for 16–19 year olds who already have a very generous free entitlement
to learning (of which more below).
However, the most fundamental problem with this agenda is the failure
to address what might be the most important constraint on the demand
for lifelong learning, below the level of higher education. Whereas the
returns to most HE qualiﬁcations are quite high so that individuals can
bear some of the costs and still achieve good net material rewards over
their lifetimes, the returns to FE qualiﬁcations seem more uncertain
(and are certainly under-researched). People are prepared to pay for the
lessons which will help them pass a driving test, because the returns to
having a licence in terms of general mobility and in terms of improving
employment chances are pretty unambiguous. They will only put their
own money into courses leading to the attainment of FE qualiﬁcations
if they perceive similarly clear returns. As Stanton (1999) points out,
one advantage of income contingent loans over ILAs is that income-
contingency leaves some of the risk with the State rather than the
individual if the learning does not pay-off.
Getting entitlement right
A 16 year old who has just sat their GCSEs already has quite a generous
entitlement. They can have up to four years’ free full-time further educa-
tion (or 2–3 years government-supported training), which in principle
should allow someone even with rather low GCSE attainment at 16 the
opportunity to progress through a Foundation (level 1) to an Intermediate
(level 2) and even to an Advanced (level 3) qualiﬁcation. If they reach
level 3 they have in front of them up to four more years of still heavily
subsidised higher education – time enough to get a ﬁrst degree and a
teaching qualiﬁcation, for example. The only requirements on individuals
in this system relate to the individual’s capacity for progression. Thus,
institutions will rightly be reluctant to allow people onto courses leading,
80 The new learning marketsay, to level 3 or higher qualiﬁcations unless individuals have the
background likely to ensure a reasonable chance of success. It is hard
to see why we would want to make this entitlement more generous.
However, the National Skills Taskforce (1999) wants to switch 
away from an entitlement speciﬁed in terms of years to one speciﬁed 
in terms of qualiﬁcation outcomes. They want the state to guarantee 
an entitlement to at least a level 3 qualiﬁcation. This is justiﬁed in
terms of an analysis of the ‘skills gap’ in the UK workforce, which 
in turn goes to the heart of the argument in the White Paper for the
strong ‘command and control’ element in the new learning framework.
Table 1 (see page 83) is a reproduction from the second report of 
the National Skills Taskforce, showing how the employed workforce 
is divided up into different occupational categories and showing 
trends in the structure of the workforce over the period 1981–2006.
Table 2 (see page 84) uses exactly the same data, but puts it in the 
form of the percentage of the employed workforce falling into the
different occupational categories. It also separates out the two 
top managerial and professional occupations.
The Taskforce report, referring to the data in table 1, states that:
‘The CBI estimate that at least 50% of the jobs in the economy already
require level 3 or higher level skills – a percentage which is continuing
to rise fast. At level 3 alone there are more than eight million jobs in
our economy which can broadly be described as being at intermediate
skill level’ (National Skills Taskforce, 1999, page 23, emphasis added). 
Now it is relatively easy to spot where the eight million ﬁgure comes
from in table 1. In 1996, 8456000 jobs were in the intermediate level
occupations. From table 2 (though not immediately from table 1) it is
also possible to see where the 50% ﬁgure comes from. In 1996, 32·9%
of the workforce were in the intermediate level occupations and a further
17·2% were in the higher managerial and professional occupations.
Add these together and you get 50·1% – so far so good.
What is really interesting is to look at the trends in evidence in
tables 1 and 2. Using exactly the same method as that employed by 
the Taskforce, in 1981, 48% of the workforce required level 3 or higher
skills and in 2006 it is forecast that 51·5% of the workforce will require
level 3 or higher skills. So over a quarter of a century changes in the
structure of employment will require an extra two and a half percentage
points of the workforce to acquire skills at level 3 or above, or one
percentage point each decade. So the National Skills Taskforce is
demonstrating that in practice the labour market demand for level 3 and
level 4 skills is increasing at a snail’s pace. This does not amount to the
‘…fast moving knowledge-based economy…’ described by the DfEE
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model which it apparently seeks to establish for post-16 learning.
Tables 1 and 2 illustrate an important general theme: the evidence
relied upon by the Taskforce, the DfEE and other ‘planners’ to justify
command and control is consistently handled in a sloppy fashion 
and usually fails to show what it is meant to show.
Table 3 (see page 85) provides a useful counterweight to the picture
portrayed in tables 1 and 2. It is based on the results of two sample surveys
of individuals carried out in 1986 and in 1997, which asked what qualiﬁ-
cations were required in order to get the job held currently (bearing in
mind the distinction between qualiﬁcations and skills). The results of
these surveys conﬁrm that over time, the increased share of the managerial,
professional and technical occupations has clearly resulted in an increase
in the requirement for people to have higher (level 4) qualiﬁcations in
order to gain access to these jobs. At the same time the proportion of the
workforce required to have only level 3 qualiﬁcations has fallen, primarily
reﬂecting the declining share of employment of the intermediate craft or
skilled manual occupations. There has been an increase in the requirement
for individuals to hold lower level 1 and especially level 2 qualiﬁcations
(in part reﬂecting the growth in the personal service occupations and
the penetration of qualiﬁcations within those occupations). There has
been a signiﬁcant fall in the proportion of jobs which can be accessed
without any qualiﬁcations.
However, in 1997 people in the workforce believed that qualiﬁcations
at level 3 and above were required by only 37% of jobs. If one accepts
the argument that individuals have a better idea than the planners about
what is really going on in the labour market, then the numbers in table 3
are sobering for fans of the National Learning Targets.
If an entitlement is to be speciﬁed in terms of a level of qualiﬁcation,
then a point around level 2 seems appropriate, and indeed is the entitlement
offered in the New Deals. The report from the Social Exclusion Unit 
on disadvantaged 16–18 year olds rightly advocated that policy should
focus on delivering a minimum entitlement to level 2 qualiﬁcations 
for as high a proportion of the age group as possible (SEU, 1999). 
For adults, an entitlement to learning leading to this level of outcome
for those currently at risk of labour market exclusion should be publicly
funded, which further calls into question the role of ILAs as a way of
increasing individual investment in learning. 
In 1997 someone with a level 2 qualiﬁcation could have accessed
63% of the jobs in the economy, and at current rates of change this 
will not fall below 60% for another 20 years and not below 50% for
another 90 years. The claim by the National Skills Taskforce that by
82 The new learning marketthe end of the next decade up to two-thirds of employment will be at
level 3 is wrong and is a good illustration of the failure of the planners
to understand what is really going on in the economy.
What about the productivity gap? Table 4 (see page 86) separates out the
six OECD countries (seven if (West) Germany is included) where measured
output per hour worked was signiﬁcantly higher than in the UK in 1996,
the eight countries where productivity was not signiﬁcantly different, and
the nine countries where productivity levels were signiﬁcantly lower.
What is most striking are the countries with productivity at similar
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Table 1. Employment by occupation (in thousands)
Employment levels (000s)
Intermediate level occupations 1981 1996 2006
Corporate managers and administrators 418 665 730
Managers/proprietors in agric. & services 1475 1582 1730
Science & engineering assoc. professionals 450 634 749
Health associate professionals 695 783 837
Other associate professionals 597 1148 1561
Skilled construction trades 576 595 633
Skilled engineering trades 1445 924 795
Other skilled trades 2162 1672 1601
Buyers, brokers and sales reps. 461 462 502
Total intermediate occupations 8279 8465 9138
Other occupations
Corporate managers and administrators 1253 1996 2192
Professional occupations 2019 2408 2667
Clerical and secretarial occupations 4042 4134 4172
Personal and protective service occupations 1753 2555 2955
Sales occupations 1261 1496 1657
Semi- and unskilled manual occupations 5487 4688 4415
Total other occupations 15815 17277 18058
Total employment 24094 25742 27196
Note: 25% of corporate managers can be classiﬁed at intermediate level
Source: National Skills Taskforce, 1999Table 2. Employment by occupation (by percentage)
Employment proportions (%)
Intermediate level occupations 1981 1996 2006
Corporate managers and administrators 1·7 2·6 2·7
Managers/proprietors in agric. & services 6·1 6·1 6·4
Science & engineering assoc. professionals 1·9 2·5 2·8
Health associate professionals 2·9 3·0 3·1
Other associate professionals 2·5 4·5 5·7
Skilled construction trades 2·4 2·3 2·3
Skilled engineering trades 6·0 3·6 2·9
Other skilled trades 9·0 6·5 5·9
Buyers, brokers and sales reps. 1·9 1·8 1·8
Total intermediate occupations 34·4 32·9 33·6
Professional/managerial occupations
Corporate managers and administrators 5·2 7·8 8·1
Professional occupations 8·4 9·4 9·8
Total professional/managerial occupations 13·6 17·2 17·9
Other occupations
Clerical and secretarial occupations 16·8 16·1 15·3
Personal and protective service occupations 7·3 9·9 10·9
Sales occupations 5·2 5·8 6·1
Semi- and unskilled manual occupations 22·8 18·2 16·2
Total other occupations 52·1 50·0 48·5
Total employment 100·0 100·0 100·0
Note: 25% of corporate managers can be classiﬁed at intermediate level
Source: National Skills Taskforce, 1999
84 The new learning marketlevels to the UK, including such notoriously ‘inefﬁcient’ economies as
Switzerland, Austria and Denmark. The UK comes out in the middle of
this table with rather average levels of productivity. The UK also comes
out in the middle of the rankings in terms of GDP per head (further details
are in Robinson 1999a). If the UK is shown not to have particularly low
productivity then this takes the ‘heat’ off the deﬁciencies of the education
and training system as the explanation of that low productivity.
To highlight the complexities of the debate, we could take the fact
that Switzerland, Austria and Denmark have similar levels of productivity
to Britain, and use it as a useful control for understanding the UK’s
‘productivity gap’. The superior productivity performance of (West)
Germany has often been ascribed in large part to its Dual System of
apprenticeship-based training and the resulting high proportion of 
the workforce with intermediate vocational qualiﬁcations. However,
Switzerland, Austria and Denmark also have similar Dual Systems 
and high proportions of the workforce with vocational qualiﬁcations.
This apparently does not buy them higher productivity than in the UK. 
The point to make here is that the belief amongst policy makers that
economic performance and educational outcomes are closely related is
not accepted by many economists – yet it is precisely this belief which
justiﬁes the ‘command and control’ elements in the White Paper. 
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Table 3. Qualiﬁcations required in Britain, 1986 and 1997
% of all workers
Qualiﬁcations Qualiﬁcations
required1 necessary2
Qualiﬁcations level 1986 1997 1986 1997
Level 4 (Higher) 20·2 23·8 16·2 18·4
of which degree 9·8 13·9 7·6 10·5
of which sub-degree 10·5 10·0 8·7 8·0
Level 3 15·3 13·3 11·8 9·8
Level 2 18·5 21·4 12·0 15·4
Level 1 7·7 8·9 6·1 6·9
None 38·3 31·4 n/a n/a
Notes: 1. Highest qualiﬁcation now required to get current job
2. Required qualiﬁcation is ‘fairly necessary’ or ‘essential’ to do the job
Source: Green et al., 1998.So to understand why the White Paper looks as it does we have 
to understand the economic arguments which lie behind it. 
And to criticise the command and control elements has to 
involve criticising those economic arguments.
Getting the funding mechanism right
An issue which is strongly related to the ‘command and control’
elements in the White Paper is the justiﬁcation for allowing the local
Learning and Skills Councils a large element of discretionary funding
to support local priorities and also the ability to vary locally the
funding tariffs. 
In its response to the White Paper, the CBI set out the case clearly:
‘While most funding should follow individuals, there do need to be 
Table 4. Relative levels of labour productivity and GDP per head, 1996
GDP per GDP per GDP per GDP per
hour worked head hour worked head
Belgium 129 112 Sweden 93 99
Norway 125 132 Finland 93 96
France 123 108 Spain 86 79
Netherlands 119 105 Japan 85 118
Italy 119 102 New Zealand 69 89
United States 118 141 Greece 68 64
Germany 109 107 Portugal 57 66
Ireland 106 98 Mexico 39 40
Austria 101 111 Korea 37 70
United Kingdom 100 100 Turkey 36 32
Canada 96 111 Czech Rep. 32 47
Switzerland 95 126
Australia 95 107 OECD 90 102
Denmark 94 114 EU 105 100
Notes: Margin of error at least + or − ten percentage points. (UK = 100)
Source: Robinson, 1999
86 The new learning marketenough funding controls at local level for local LSCs to help match
skills supply to labour market needs’ (CBI, 1999, page 12, emphasis
added). In other words the main employer’s organisation does not
believe that the learning market will in fact work and that a planning
mechanism at local level will do a better job in matching supply and
demand in the labour market. 
It is not clear that the Government agrees with the CBI. Although the 
‘…local LSCs will be responsible for allocating the great bulk of funds …
this type of discretion will be limited in reality by the requirement that
most funds should be allocated on a formula funding basis.’ (DfEE,
1999b, page 16). It would thus appear that the power to vary tariffs
locally will in practice be quite limited and determined centrally by 
the national Learning and Skills Council. It will only be used to address
clearly evidenced local shortages of a particular type of provision and 
‘…the national LSC will need to ensure that variations apply only to a
small amount of the local LSC’s total funding’ (DfEE, 1999c, page 27).
Moreover, although 10–15% of total funding will be passed over to
the local LSCs, there is a long list of provision which this funding will
have to cover. Each local LSC will have to fund the following from this
pot: information, advice and guidance for adults, marketing and promo-
tion activity, adult and community learning, workforce development
including Investors in People, help for excluded learners, support for
local regeneration initiatives, and if anything is left after all this, they
can ‘pump prime’ local small scale initiatives. The local LSCs may ﬁnd
that in practice they have very little leeway to fund their own initiatives.
The Regional Development Agencies also in practice have little leeway
to spend their funds. The prospect for the RDAs and the local LSCs is
that employers may be misled by the rhetoric of powerful employer-led
strategic bodies to think that they will have more authority to spend
funds as they see ﬁt than will in fact be the case. The problems this 
will cause are already in evidence with the RDAs.
However, if one thinks that the learning market is able to meet the
needs of the labour market, because individuals can read labour market
signals perfectly well and make rational choices about their learning
needs, local bodies do not need large sums of discretionary cash. In a
learning market the local LSCs will largely act as conduits for funding
rather than planners. The statement in the prospectus for the LSC that
‘The allocation of the great majority of the LSC’s funds will depend on
demand from individuals and businesses…’ (DfEE, 1999c, page 26),
suggests that the DfEE really does believe in the learning market 
and is shying away from the command and control model. 
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Hall and Macleod (1999) set out a division of labour between the
Learning and Skills Council, and the local LSCs, and the new Youth
Support Service (YSS) and the Employment Service (ES), and their local
ofﬁces. The LSC would be responsible for funding learning while the
latter bodies would fund learners, by dealing with the barriers relating
to transport, ﬁnance, child care and so on which might prevent people
from accessing learning. Currently, this support for learners is also part
of the very broad remit for the local LSCs. Hall and Macleod (1999)
suggest that the YSS should perform these functions for the 16–19 age
group and the ES for the post-19 age group. For the Employment Service
this would be consistent with their developing role as the body responsible
for the new single gateway which will gradually be extended to 
a broader section of the working age population. 
In this model the ES would have responsibility for providing guidance
for the post-19 age group. The White Paper leaves the local LSCs with
responsibility for adult guidance, which would set up an unacceptable
conﬂict of interest for bodies that also have responsibility for delivering
local learning targets (Robinson, 1999b). However, there may also 
be concerns about the quality and impartiality of guidance provided 
by the ES. But if the local LSCs look overburdened with functions,
taking adult guidance away from them would be most appropriate.
In Hall and Macleod’s formulation there does not appear to be much
of a role for the local Learning Partnerships (LLPs) and indeed it has
been a longstanding puzzle as to what the division of labour is going to
be between the local LSCs and the LLPs. The DfEE has suggested that
the LLPs would work with the LSCs to provide information, advice and
guidance and have a role in providing information on local learning needs.
The LLPs would also ‘…provide the means for securing collaboration
between local providers … to tackle gaps and help avoid duplication…’
(DfEE, 1999c, page 24). In Robinson (1999b) it was argued that these
were some of the key functions that needed to be performed by a local
‘planning body’ if you believed that the learning market could work. 
At the time of writing the relationship between the local LSCs and LLPs
remained unclear in DfEE documents. What can be stated is that if the
local LSCs are as administratively costly as the Regional Development
Agencies, then the Government will not save on the administrative costs
associated with the TECs, which was one of the explicit goals set out
in the White Paper. The current proposals could easily be caricatured
as replacing one set of expensive local bureaucracies with another set.
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The DfEE and the CBI appear to be keen on two key features in the
proposed framework. Firsly, the national LSC and local LSCs will 
have clear responsibility for delivering the National Learning Targets.
Secondly, the local LSCs would be responsible for workforce develop-
ment (that is training for employees), where employers have a legitimate
concern to see a structure in place which is responsive to their needs.
Other than as devices to illustrate what might be desirable
aspirations for the learning system to achieve, planning in the form of
National Targets has absolutely no role to play in a modern dynamic
market economy. They are a throwback to the 1960s when the white
heat of the technological revolution (for which read the knowledge-
based revolution) appeared to require national manpower planning 
for its achievement. 
However, the Government’s plans to have a public body in charge 
of £6 billion of taxpayers’ money also responsible for delivering the
National Targets raises the spectre of a return to manpower planning.
If the job of the Chief Executive of the LSC is on the line if he/she fails
to hit the targets, how could the Council not resist the temptation to
skew the funding mechanism to serve that end? Funding would no longer
follow the learner – it would follow the need to hit the targets. This sets
up an unacceptable conﬂict of interest for the LSC. 
In its response to the White Paper, the CBI sets out a very clear
description of the key areas where some public intervention is desirable
in the area of workforce development, while acknowledging that it is
primarily the responsibility of employers themselves:
  Tackling structural problems of ﬁrms which do not 
see the beneﬁts of training or are not equipped to plan 
their own development programmes…
  Spreading good practice in training and development with start
up funds for pump-priming companies’ use of initiatives…
  Benchmarking of current practice…
  Providing information to companies about what is available…
CBI, 1999
This is strikingly sensible because it is strikingly modest, but it ﬁts very
ill with the CBI’s apparent support for ‘command and control’. Moreover,
local LSCs are not the appropriate mechanism for dealing with these
problems. What is needed are local employer-led bodies with a remit 
to offer a series of services, including access to pump-priming funds, 
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the development of their workforces, and then to think about the role
of training in workforce development. So the body that offers business
services and the body which helps ﬁrms with their training should be
one and the same body. In practice, this logic is reﬂected in the overly
complex model whereby the responsibilities of the local LSCs for work-
force development will anyway be franchised to the local arm of the
Small Business Service. The fact that we have the local LSCs, and
separately the Small Business Service’s local franchises, reﬂects the
failure of the DfEE to let the DTI take over an area of policy which
should be part of the DTI’s remit. If the LSCs did not have responsibility
for workforce development this would further lighten their load.
A ﬁnal thought
The contrast between the ‘learning market’ model and the planning or
‘command and control’ model will continue to be the focus for tension
as the White Paper is implemented and the national Learning and Skills
Council and the local LSCs come into being. It could be the case that
the rhetoric of national, regional and local planning disguises a set of
arrangements which in reality will look like a learning market, where
provision is driven by funding streams that follow the informed choices
of learners. This is the benign scenario. The negative scenario is that
the perceived need to plan provision to overcome the skills gap will 
re-create a system of manpower planning that has long since been
discredited. The key issue is whether the LSC will act as purchaser on
behalf of learners, or will also try to act as an independent purchaser
trying to serve the ill-deﬁned needs of the economy.
90 The new learning marketReferences
CBI. Response to the Learning to succeed White Paper. 
pp 5–6, CBI, October 1999.
DfEE (1999a). Learning to succeed: a new framework 
for post-16 learning. DfEE, Cm. 4392, June 1999.
DfEE (1999b). Learning to succeed: consultation on a proposed
funding and allocations framework. DfEE, December 1999.
DfEE (1999c). The Learning and Skills Council prospectus. 
DfEE, December 1999.
Green F, Ashton D, Burchell B, Davies B, Felstead A. 
Are British workers getting more skilled? In Exclusion, 
employment and opportunity. CASE paper 4, 
Centre for analysis of social exclusion, LSE, 1990. 
Hall G, Macleod D. Funding mechanisms and methodology.
Presentation at second IPPR–FEDA seminar, November 1999.
National Skills Taskforce. Delivering skills for all. Second report 
of the National Skills Taskforce. DfEE, 1999.
Robinson P (1999a). The economics of lifelong learning. 
Paper presented at the Scott Policy seminar, Belfast, October 1999.
Robinson P (1999b). Education and training as a learning market.
Paper presented at ﬁrst IPPR–FEDA seminar, October 1999.
Social Exclusion Unit. Bridging the gap: new opportunities 
for 16–18 year olds not in education, employment or training. 
Social Exclusion Unit, Cm. 4405, July 1999.
Stanton G. The new learning market: who pays, and for what?
Paper presented at second IPPR–FEDA seminar, 
November 1999 (q.v. chapter 4).
The drivers for change in post-16 learning  91Introduction
There is one clear fact about any interpretation of the recent 
White Paper Learning to succeed – that the Government wants 
the post-16 education system to listen to employers.
Employers should have a substantial stake in shaping post-16
education and training … the proposals for a Learning and Skills
Council at national and local level will give employers unprecedented
inﬂuence over the education system and promote a better match
between demand and supply for skills.
The alarm bells have gone off throughout colleges, universities and
examining boards. They are still ringing at funding bodies and at
TECs up and down the country. Many probably feel that we have
listened to employers for far too long already – can the DfEE possibly
not know what it is like to sit in a College Corporation Meeting and
listen to some local builder drone on about how young people are not
as clever as they once were? Even board members from the local TECs
have failed to convince corporations of their knowledge or interest 
in many of the issues confronting providers of post-16 education.
The purpose of this paper is to look at what employers really know,
what they should expect and whether education should really listen 
at all. The paper also draws conclusions about how this inﬂuence
should impact on both the supply and demand sides of 
educational policy delivery.
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What do employerswant? 
Dotheyknow? 
Andshould welisten?
AndyWestwood
Employment Policy Institute
7
Paper prepared for the third IPPR–FEDA seminar 
on the new learning market, 14 December 1999.What do employers know?
Employers are expecting people to be job ready; ‘dressed’ for
work – they want people who can read, people who are numerate,
they want people who turn up on time, they want people who 
can work well in a team, people who can communicate well – 
and they’re expecting this to be achieved before they get to 
the employer … and it’s a very difﬁcult thing to do and it 
will cost more money than we are currently spending on 
them and it will have to be more intense.
Tom Shebbeare, Chief Executive, Prince’s Trust
Employers talk a different language to educationalists. Their needs 
are quantiﬁably different. They talk of skill needs and deﬁciencies,
competences and employability. The supply and demand sides to 
the education debate are more entrenched than in any other sector.
Very few commentators advocate, or attempt to combine supply side
reform with demand led delivery of skills. The fundamental proposition
posed in this paper is how much the different sectors actually talk 
a similar language and how ‘skills’ via a limited planning model 
can actually be seen as a common vocational currency across 
the sectors of education and employment. 
The difference of opinion is nothing new. The debate over the
education system and its ability and responsibility to provide relevant
work skills for the workplace is a subject of longstanding controversy.
There has been a general perception over time that employers,
commentators and politicians have not been happy with the skill levels
of the UK labour market’s potential and actual workforce. 
There is a huge range and variety of documented opinion, research
ﬁndings and formal educational reforms that have all aimed to address
and draw appropriate curriculum conclusions on the issue more recently
named ‘employability’. Historically, the connection between ‘training’
and work was ﬁrst highlighted in 1563 in the Statute of Artiﬁciers, an
Elizabethan law dictating that all ‘artisans’ (skilled craftsmen) would
be required to serve an apprenticeship of not less than seven years.
Employers have expressed their concerns regarding both the standard
and appropriateness of the education and skills of their workers fairly
consistently since the 17th century. Whilst these concerns are focused
on both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ skills, over the past twenty years there appears
to have been a greater focus on needs for ‘soft skills’. The long lasting
hard versus soft skills debate has been refocused heavily by the remarkable
growth in service sector employment and in emerging key skills reform
and imminent legislation. 
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signiﬁcant gap between the skills of their recruits and their
current business needs, with personal and communication 
skills among the most deﬁcient. There is growing recognition 
that effective employees need strong personal qualities as well as
good qualiﬁcations … Since 1950 the UK has lost 5 million jobs
in the producing industries and gained some 8 million in services.
We now earn more revenue from Indian restaurants than from
coal, steel and shipbuilding combined.
Tom Bentley. Learning beyond the classroom. Demos, 1998
To listen to employers effectively you have to understand their
language. You also have to have at least half an eye on a changing 
UK labour market and the shift towards the differing skill
requirements of a new service and knowledge based economy. 
The Skills Taskforce acknowledges the changing environment 
but also looks closely at existing demands and outlines the 
concerns of employers as follows:
Employers repeatedly express concerns about the employability
and key skills of young people entering the labour market for the
ﬁrst time, including graduates. Employers also report a lack of
practical skills relating to the application of technical knowledge
in the working environment. This is consistent with the relative
weakness of apprenticeship and other formal vocational 
training for young people in the UK compared to other 
European countries.
Research from employers’ groups backs this commentary. 
The Institute of Directors (IOD), the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI), the Institute of Personnel and Development (IPD) 
and the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) have all commissioned
and published research on the subject in the past few years. All conclude
that there is a skills gap and that young people leaving education do
not possess all the skills that deﬁne ‘job readiness’ as suggested by 
Tom Shebbeare at the beginning of this paper. The most useful
description of skill shortages comes in the annual Skills Needs 
in Britain survey heavily utilised by the CBI. Earlier this year, 
it provided an analysis of perceived skill shortages in the 
UK labour market (see table 1 overleaf):
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lacking in 16–24 year olds
Technical and practical skills 25%
General communication skills 20%
Customer handling skills 19%
Team working skills 17%
Computer literacy 16%
Problem solving skills 15%
Management skills 15%
Managing own development 14%
Numeracy skills 8%
Literacy skills 7%
Source: Skills needs in Britain & Northern Ireland 1998
Vocational and job speciﬁc skills come out on top of employers’ needs,
but generic skills form the remaining requirements. This ﬁnding is more
or less echoed in a recent survey of its members by the IOD. In this
work IT comes out on top (29%), followed by vocational skills (20%)
and technical skills (a further 7%). Generic skills are also represented
by the following categories; basic/generic skills (14%), communication
skills (9%) and management skills (19%). The interesting elements
come with the implied responsibility for types of skill:
To a crucial extent, it is the owner’s or the manager’s
responsibility to deal with skill shortages, skill gaps and 
other recruitment difﬁculties. In the ﬁrst instance, the owner 
or manager is much more likely to have the requisite knowledge
to determine what training – if any – his employees need, than
anyone else … Additionally, because the performance of the
enterprise has direct ﬁnancial consequences for the owner or
manager, he has a powerful incentive to address any deﬁciencies
in skills that the employees in his ﬁrm may have.
Richard Wilson. The skills and training agenda. IOD, 1999
In this report, Richard Wilson of the IOD goes on to state that 
a government’s role should therefore be limited and that they 
could never truly be able to predict future skills needs of employers. 
The prime responsibility of the government is ‘speciﬁc and limited’ 
and should concentrate on ‘addressing the deﬁciencies of the 
British education system’.
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and the essential generic skills that are needed in the workplace.
Individuals who lack these basic skills reduce their chances of
employment and, generally speaking, are harder for employers 
to train than individuals who possess these skills.
The CBI, in their recent publication Making employability work are
even more explicit in their deﬁnitions of employability and in their
perception of the relevant responsibilities of education and employers:
The foundation education system needs to develop employability
more effectively. The Skills needs in Britain survey reveals that a
number of persistent gaps remain in the skills of young people –
though speciﬁc technical and practical skills are a matter for
employers rather than education to tackle.
Table 2. Qualities and competences which make up employability
  Values and attitudes compatible with the work – including a desire to
learn, to apply that learning, to improve and to take advantage of change
  Basic skills (literacy and numeracy)
  Key skills sufﬁcient for the needs of the work
  Other generic skills that are becoming increasingly ‘key’ – 
such as modern language and customer service skills
  Up-to-date and relevant knowledge and understanding
  Up-to-date, job-speciﬁc skills
  The ability to manage one’s own career
Source: Based on In search of employability. CBI, 1998
Employers’ organisations such as the CBI and the IOD are therefore
clear about the priorities for delivery of skills – both for education and
for individual employers. They are also more sophisticated than some
commentators might have us believe. Their highly developed under-
standing of generic and key skills, and also of delineated responsibility,
suggests that the ‘language barriers’ between education and employment
may, in fact, be exaggerated. Their response is also good news for the
Treasury – speciﬁc vocational training will clearly cost the country 
less if we follow this model. Perhaps a signiﬁcant shot in the arm 
for the strategy behind setting up ILAs.
But what about actual employers? Are they as sophisticated as 
their representative bodies? During a research project earlier this year,
much of which has been reproduced in this paper, we spoke to many
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their own speciﬁc attitudes to skill needs, training and to the perceived
qualities of GCSE, GNVQ and A/AS level. Many bear out the views 
of the CBI and the IOD. 
Michael O’Dwyer, General Manager of the London Marriott Hotel
at County Hall sees the presence of basic skills and basic motivation 
as most desirable. He looks speciﬁcally for young people, regardless of
qualiﬁcation, with the ability to work in a team, to solve problems and
to respect customers and colleagues. Provided a prospective employee
can bring these qualities, O’Dwyer proudly states that he and the
organisation will provide absolutely everything else. 
This is a knowledge shared with Compass UK – the largest provider
of hospitality and associated catering in Europe. They too work in one
of the largest and fastest growing sectors in the UK economy, and also
share a similarly sophisticated view of potential recruits. Unsurprisingly,
their priorities for skills are also similar. Flexibility, team-working skills,
communication, loyalty, customer handling skills and motivation all
feature very highly. Skill development, and especially training, is invested
in those employees who can show most loyalty, motivation and ﬂexibility
(crucial to a multi-sited, unsociable hours operation). 
Tesco, now the largest private sector employer in the UK, completed
our look at skills in the service sector. Once more, they concentrate on
a mix of good basic skills and respect and motivation as a recipe for
potential recruits:
What we look for above everything else and sadly this is often in
the shortest supply, is someone who can respect our customers.
Chris Phillips, Manager, Tesco Evesham
This is augmented by the already familiar qualities of teamwork, problem
solving and attention to detail. Indeed, Tesco are so sophisticated in
their requirements for skills that they have developed their own compe-
tence based training programme as a replacement for NVQ. They have
also discontinued their graduate recruitment programme as it has failed
to provide the type of individual who could be expected to manage
stores within two to three years. Instead they have introduced their
‘Options Scheme’. This encourages store managers to concentrate 
the development training outlined above on those individuals who
have demonstrated most of the organisation’s key skill requirements.
These are the people who will go on to manage sections, 
shifts and stores. 
The initial identiﬁcation and the monitored development 
of these individuals, who have come to Tesco as General Assistants 
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the application of seventeen critical success factors. Signiﬁcantly, 
only one of these seventeen relates to technical knowledge.
Table 3. Tesco critical success factors
1. Setting objectives 10. Motivation
2. Planning and organising 11. Development of people
3. Controlling quality and standards 12. Teamwork
4. Analysis 13. Adaptability
5. Decision making 14. Drive
6. Innovation 15. Customer focus
7. Conceptual thinking 16. Commercial awareness
8. Ensuring understanding 17. Applied technical
9. Inﬂuencing and professional skills
Source: Tesco Options Programme, 1999
The intriguing fact about the service sector’s apparent sophistication 
is that historically it has always been seen as a ‘low skill’ environment.
Retail, hospitality and catering were all sectors criticised in the hugely
inﬂuential (and still unpopular!) The failure of education and training
in Britain (Finegold and Soskice, 1988). Indeed, these sectors were
deemed to be the principal exponents of the ‘low skill equilibrium’ 
that similarly underpinned sectors such as manufacturing, 
agriculture, engineering and construction. There is evidence 
to suggest that this work is not unskilled – particularly in terms 
of the desirable generic and key skills listed by respective employers.
However, even if one considered these skills to be ‘low’ – it can 
still be stated that evidence of generic and key skills in potential
employees has become more vital to initial entry into the labour
market, even into perceived ‘low skill’ jobs. 
Ken Mayhew, of Pembroke College Oxford explained the 
increasing requirement of generic skills in the service sector 
as a rise in demand for what he described as ‘aesthetic labour’
(Employment Policy Institute parliamentary brieﬁng, May 1999).
Other employers from more traditional sectors also 
look more closely for generic and key skills than in the past. 
Technical and vocational skills are more highly regarded than 
in the service sector, but employers are less ﬁxated by them 
and more inclined to provide this type of training. 
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  Wanting to learn   Problem solving (seen as hallmark
  The ability to question learning of German education system)
  Analytical/diagnostic skills   Presentation skills
  Teamworking skills (essential)   Mental arithmetic
Source: Andy Renton, Human Resources Manager, Ford UK.
Employment Policy Institute, 1999
Ford recruit a vast number of employees of different age and skill 
levels and for careers including engineering, manufacturing, sales,
administration, human resources, information technology, training and
management. They are thus familiar with a wide range of qualiﬁcations
and skills and have tremendous experience and a good reputation for
their own training provision. As a company they are also heavily linked
to educational providers including schools, colleges and universities
for a range of reasons including informal associations, governing 
body representation, careers service work, placement opportunities
and joint programme delivery.
At their Dagenham and Brentwood operations, Derek Todd is
Manager of the Apprentice Education and Training programme. 
He runs an Advanced GNVQ in Engineering for the Ford apprentice
intake, in association with Havering and Barking Colleges. One might
expect this programme to be so heavily business focused that it would
be intentionally biased toward Ford technical processes and not on
more general elements and options within the GNVQ units. This is 
not the case: the Ford GNVQ is actually more general than the GNVQs
taught to the regular intake of engineering students at these London
colleges. The programme incorporates additional English and Maths
and team-working skills, beyond those found in the key skills compo-
nents of the programme. This is at the expense of the technical knowledge
so often found in similar education based programmes:
We teach basic engineering in the ﬁrst year (of four) and then we
never use it again … We don’t want people whose skills become
out of date in two years, we need the skills in the programme 
to have a much longer shelf life. Derek Todd, Ford UK
Andy Renton, Manager of Human Resources and Personnel Services,
is clear that the education system needs to provide a clear framework
with generic skills as opposed to technical knowledge. He believes that
the ‘connectivity’ between industry and education is sadly lacking,
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oration with academics in the United States, at the Ford Headquarters
in Detroit and at similar meetings at their operations in Stuttgart in
Germany. This, he believes, is the cornerstone for real educational
standards at university level and not through massive expansion and
‘dumbing down’ of our degree system. He does, however, reserve this
argument exclusively for higher education as his opinion of schools
and college standards is far more generous:
I get annoyed with all this carping criticism about educational
standards. Kids work harder today, they work longer and they are
better prepared. No-one in the past has been any better prepared
for employment or university. Andy Renton, Ford UK
Ford are clearly very positive about the business use for these
transferable skills, and at the expense of speciﬁc vocational provision.
This does not necessarily suggest that they are completely happy with
existing post-16 provision. Indeed, they bemoan the fact that they feel
it necessary to have to add more such skills to these programmes in
their own training schemes. However, their support for the type and
style of learning, when placed in a clear framework, is unequivocal.
How much should we listen to employers?
Many commentators, from both academia and the media suggest 
that we should pay little attention to the demands of employers. 
Indeed many advocate complete rejection of their views:
It may be that education is desirable in its own right – indeed it
almost certainly is, provided that what is delivered is education
rather than merely a training checklist demanded by business.
Larry Elliott and Dan Atkinson. The age of insecurity
Employers should be induced to put their money where 
their mouth is and invest signiﬁcantly – following the 
German example – in vocational education, at the 
end of which they should guarantee apprenticeships. 
Only by investing signiﬁcantly in vocational education 
as a distinct route to achievement, by resourcing it well 
and by providing jobs at the end of the process will 
we crack the destructive assumption that a university 
degree is the only qualiﬁcation that matters.
Melanie Phillips. All must have prizes
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year in both human and physical capital, especially in the public
sector. The pattern of disappointment cannot be blamed on 
any particular sub-sector. Although at a disaggregated level
productivity in engineering and metals is especially poor, the
same pattern is echoed across industry, services, agriculture,
construction and the public sector. 
Diane Coyle. The Independent, 1999
We also need to be aware of the apparent differences in observed 
skill priorities and actual recruitment practice. 
This gap between what employers say, and what they do, 
has caused signiﬁcant problems for training policy. We need 
to move to a situation where Pavlovian responses to ofﬁcial
enquiries cease, and where all the actors are willing and able to
provide policymakers with an honest view of current and likely
future attitudes and intentions. Until this happens, vocational
education and training policy is being constructed on sand.
Towards a national skills agenda. First report of the 
National Skills Taskforce, DfEE, 1999
How much is the distrust likely to affect the harnessing of employers’
views in the shaping of educational priorities and speciﬁcally in 
the workings of national and local Learning and Skills Councils? 
Larry Elliott and Dan Atkinson are perhaps the most realistic and 
their words of caution are important. However, our research suggests
that employers and employers’ organisations deserve to be listened 
to more closely than we perhaps may have advocated a few years ago.
Our evidence compiled in this research suggests that employers are
more considered, understanding and knowledgeable of qualiﬁcations
and skill sets than ever before. Indeed it may even be fair to say that
employers’ knowledge of education and its ‘language’ far outstrips
education’s knowledge of the workplace.
Contrary to the opinions of both Melanie Phillips and Diane Coyle,
there is also evidence to suggest that employers are indeed putting 
their money where their mouths are – at least in comparison to other
developed countries. This is particularly interesting given our typically
poor performance in comparison to these countries in other matters
pertaining to education and training (see table 5 opposite):
102 The new learning marketTable 5. Education/training funded by employers 
or self and family 1994–95
Self/family Employer
UK 20% 74%
US 32% 70%
Poland 32% 65%
New Zealand 38% 64%
Ireland 37% 44%
Canada 37% 52%
Belgium 37% 51%
Netherlands 39% 54%
Australia 42% 44%
Switzerland 52% 43%
Source: OECD, 1998
This adds credence to the IOD’s assertion that employers are prepared
to pay for training of their workforces and also to contribute to the
forthcoming Individual Learning Accounts. Ironically, the major issue
with ILAs may prove to be individuals’ reluctance to contribute funding
and not the employer.
Ewart Keep and Ken Mayhew of the Universities of Warwick and
Oxford have long provided analyses of employers and education and
training in the UK. They argue that demand for skills via the education
system has risen sharply in the past 10-year period – but that this has not
resulted in an equivalent growth of higher skill needs from employers
in the UK labour market. They believe that graduates and also school
and college leavers are now doing less skilled jobs than their qualiﬁ-
cation level would have suggested in the past. This is the caveat that
must be applied to the apparent skill needs of employers. Theirs is a 
very compelling case that although employers have become increasingly
more discerning in their attitudes to education and to delivered skill sets,
this sophistication has not been matched by an equivalent increase 
in the number of higher skilled jobs available in the labour market.
Keep and Mayhew’s view is that the entry criteria for the UK labour
market is increasing and that even lower or unskilled jobs are now
demanding at least basic or generic skills prior to entry. This view is in
part backed up by the recent DfEE-sponsored inquiry into basic skills
chaired by Sir Claus Moser of the Basic Skills Agency. This report
makes startling reading – suggesting that one in ﬁve adults within 
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in four are innumerate. The report uses powerful examples:
Some 7 million adults in England – one in ﬁve adults – if given 
the alphabetical index to the Yellow Pages, cannot locate the page
reference for plumbers. This is an example of functional illiteracy. 
It means that 1 in 5 adults have less literacy than is expected of an 
11 year old child … 1 in 3 adults in this country cannot calculate the
area of a room that is 21 × 14 feet, even with the aid of a calculator; 
1 in 4 adults cannot calculate the change they should get out of £2 when
they buy a loaf of bread for 68p and two tins of beans for 45p each.
Improving literacy and numeracy: a fresh start. Report of the
working group chaired by Sir Claus Moser, DfEE
The Moser Report sees these levels of innumeracy and illiteracy as
signiﬁcant barriers not only to the UK’s overall productivity, but more
seriously to the individual’s ability to enter the labour market at all. 
There is then, evidence to suggest a growing awareness and knowledge
of skills needs amongst employers that must be welcomed and used –
especially in the framework for full time education and speciﬁcally in
the delivery and content of qualiﬁcations such as GCSE, GNVQ and
A-/AS-level. However, whilst not being quite as critical as some of the
commentators quoted in this section, we must also take note of the
utilisation of these skills.
We must not allow increased educational achievement, and particularly
in the desired ﬁelds of generic and key skills, to be wasted on perennially
low skilled jobs. Key skills should therefore also be combined with some
mechanism that ensures a desire to continue personal development 
and learning. This would see new entrants to the labour market able 
to learn new skills and to progress upwards in respective careers
and/or organisations. We at the Employment Policy Institute do not
underestimate the value of entry level jobs (one of the best forms 
of preparation for work is work itself after all), especially when
combined with further development and training opportunities. 
Employers must at least attempt to match the increased supply of
skills with an increased supply of ‘skilled’ opportunities. This, from
our research, can be seen to be happening amongst large employers 
in the traditionally low skilled service sector, with the rise in interest 
in ‘aesthetic labour’. The warnings of Finegold, Soskice, Keep and
Mayhew are not applicable here. The developments put in place 
by employers such as Tesco, Marriott and Compass should be
applauded and held up as an example to the rest of the labour market.
More importantly, at least as far as this report goes, they should also
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play more of a part in our traditional qualiﬁcations. 
There is a recipe of skills at work in employers such as Tesco and the
Marriott, supplemented in particular by the work of the CBI, that can
provide us with some very signiﬁcant pointers to the make up of qualiﬁ-
cations in the 14–19 curriculum. They also provide a very clear and
creditable set of suggestions about where the responsibility and
funding for speciﬁc skills should lie. This is good news for the purse
string holders in the education sector as well as for the policy makers. 
Employers and graduates
The demand for ‘job ready’ skills is beginning to alter as students’
experience of studying at school, college or university increasingly
involves an increasing amount of actual work. This applies to formal
elements of particular courses, to the increasing incidence of sponsored
study and through informal part-time work taken on as a consequence
of increased ﬁnancial costs.
The CVCP have recently found that the majority of UK universities
want to see mandatory key skills as a part of all advanced level study.
This is partly out of a simple recognition of the importance and trans-
ferability of learning and partly because they don’t want to have to
provide it – at least not at level 3 – themselves. In tandem with this
recognition of the importance of key skills at level 3 is the growing
body of thought that suggests that key skills are likely to be 
developed in higher education at levels 4 and 5.
An important consequence of demand for key skills at level 3, 
prior to university entrance, is the implicit realisation that it comes 
at the expense of other learning. It is signiﬁcant to see whether
universities are prepared to sacriﬁce substantial learning – most 
likely to be knowledge speciﬁc – in their desire for improved key skills.
When put to the CVCP, they considered that responses would vary
from subject to subject – same syllabus progression (e.g. medieval
history A-level to degree in medieval history) – don’t want to see the
subject knowledge sacriﬁced. It is different with less clear progression
(e.g. a history, economics and French A-level student going on to study
accountancy, marketing or management science). According to the
CVCP, the real weight of thought would support key skills over subject-
speciﬁc knowledge as the real growth degrees bear little resemblance
to advanced level study in terms of subject progression. Even in total,
same subject progression will only account for a very small percentage
of undergraduate students.
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going to be a difﬁcult nettle for higher education to grasp. Ultimately,
they are the ﬁnal judges of success at reform of advanced level study
through their own admissions policy. Their views are therefore crucial.
Professor Richard Layard of the Centre for Economic Performance at
the London School of Economics strongly supports a broader learning
programme at advanced level, but also recognises the difﬁculties of
tackling the issue head on:
Nowhere else in the world can you give up maths at 16 and 
then go on to university … Nor is there any other country where
someone doing science at university could have studied no non-
science subject since 16 … Ever since the 1950s there have been
campaigns for broader A-levels. In 1988 the Higginson Report
recommended a fundamental reform involving much more
breadth. Though broadly supported by the universities, it was
rejected by the Government. More recently, the Dearing report
(1996) recommended that a broad set of A-levels should be given
a special title – but it is unlikely that universities will encourage
many people to go for this. The best approach is gradual reform.
I would suggest the following as a ﬁrst step; universities should
insist that A-level students have at least an AS-level in maths 
and at least one AS-level in an arts or social science.
Richard Layard, CEP, London School of Economics
Both Richard Layard’s views and those of the CVCP have been supported
in the research carried out as a part of this project with several leading
UK universities. During August and September, we spoke to a range 
of different people including academic and admissions staff from
Cambridge University, Manchester University and the University 
of Hertfordshire. This sample was selected on the basis of the 
CVCP’s annual Employability study of UK graduates – with 
the selected institutions all achieving top grades in the research. 
Transferable skills as a broad heading are evident in all the skill sets
required by universities and also signiﬁcantly in the virtues claimed on
behalf of graduates. In some cases these are key skills as prescribed by
the DfEE for advanced level study (level 3) and in others they are these
skills in all but name or realisation.
A recent small-scale study carried out by the University of
Nottingham for the DfEE looked at the levels of key skill competence
in students entering higher education. It concentrated on ﬁve key skills
(problem solving was not included) and found that whilst the numbers
of students with level 3 competence in speciﬁc skills varied from 41%
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competent across all ﬁve key skills. The research went on to state that
there appeared to be a strong link between good performance at A-level
(still the dominant entry qualiﬁcation) and levels of key skill competence.
The research proceeded to recommend that key skills play a greater
part in the admissions process and that they are formally included in
UCAS procedures. This would then reveal much more about potential
undergraduates and their suitability to various university courses. 
It may even be enough for the Oxford and Cambridge Dons who 
feel they need extra help in selection processes.
A conference in 1997 organised by the Council for Industry and
Higher Education, The Times education supplement and the Institute 
of Education further deﬁned the importance of transferable skills in 
the workforce and in graduates. The event was based on the ﬁndings 
of a report entitled Employers’ survey: graduates work: organisation
change and students’ attributes. Commissioned by CVCP, CIHE, CBI,
and HEQC it concentrated on a cross-section of companies’ attitudes
to graduate skill requirements. 
The report’s main recommendations were as follows:
  Personal/interactive skills should be developed as an integral part of the
HE programme, and must be assessed or they are ‘not taken seriously’.
Employers are more experienced than most academics at assessing
skills and therefore might be used by course managers to do this.
  Organisational change within companies has implications for
graduates who need, as a result, a wide range of communication
skills. Working in project teams, for example, means working with a
wide range of personnel outside the traditional chain of responsibility.
 ‘Employability’ skills are not the same as ‘vocational’ 
and can be embedded in any course. 
  Employers want adaptive, adaptable and transformative people to
help them maintain, develop and ultimately transform their organi-
sations in response to, and preferably in anticipation of, change. 
  As the academic world changes, employers will need to develop
more sophisticated criteria than A-level scores or university
reputations. Higher education and employers might want to
cooperate in developing a more appropriate set of indicators 
of graduates’ suitability for the workplace.
At the conference launching the report, a series of high 
proﬁle representatives from business and industry including 
British Telecom, Esso and KPMG gave their views on 
critical skills in their respective workplaces: 
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ability to work in teams and cross cultural divides; a critical 
attitude to established processes; use of IT at an appropriate level;
readiness to regard learning as a continuous process 
  The basic 3 Rs at unconscious competence level 
  Autonomous learners demonstrating intellectual 
or learning skills plus creativity
  Key skills of communication, IT, numeracy, working in teams,
modern language competence, and to include scientiﬁc 
awareness integrated in to the curriculum at all levels
  Motivation
  A broad range of skills developed through a wide range of 
activities including team-work, leadership, communication,
innovation, capacity for sustaining an international focus
  Lifelong learning capacity
  Integrity.
The expectations of graduates generally, then, seem to be on similar
qualities and skills to those expected of school and college leavers. 
It would seem broadly that the changing economy is demanding 
more generic skills and less speciﬁc knowledge from its graduates. 
This in itself will increase demand for reform at advanced level 
and an expansion of generic skills at levels 4 and 5 as well as at 3. 
The increased expansion of numbers in higher education will serve 
to exacerbate this still further as will the increasing proportions of
demand for more job-related undergraduate study opportunities.
This shift in emphasis is increasingly perceptible to the extent that
even Richard Layard’s suggested compromises over reform now seem
conservative. Some particular courses and, no doubt, some particular
universities will be slow to recognise this shift and will not respond as
quickly as other organisations in the sector. The sector, as a whole, is
such that some elements may never really have to change in this way.
However, it is clear that the mainstream is gearing itself to a vastly
altered set of priorities in the future. This, as with the change in 
the perceptions of employers, is further justiﬁcation for increased
change within the make-up of the post-16 framework. 
Conclusions – implications for a learning market
It seems that employers and their organisations know quite a lot about
the types of skills they need and the types of training that they feel able
to identify, source and pay for. I have to admit that they know a lot
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stake in the shaping of post-16 education is deserved. This is particularly
true of some of the organisations and individuals that we have discussed
in this report. The new learning market will beneﬁt from their presence
at the policy table. The dilemma in their expressed needs are that they
are increasingly based on transferable skills and personal attributes.
These are not skills that easily make up speciﬁc qualiﬁcations or even
ones that sit easily in a qualiﬁcations framework. However, the nature
of employers’ needs and their application to the whole UK workforce
provides us with signiﬁcant issues in the supply and demand reaction
to the post-Learning to succeed landscape. The lessons for policy
makers in the post-White Paper world are based on how best to
incorporate these skill needs into the learning market’s overlaid
demands for speciﬁc types and level of qualiﬁcations.
These demands for transferable skills are not necessarily those readily
associated with a new knowledge economy – the opinions described in
this paper come from traditional manufacturers and established service
industries, and not just from new types of organisation. Rather this
estimation of a skills gap is now as much about initial access to the
labour market, admittedly in a more service and team orientated
working environment, as to prerequisites for progress within speciﬁc
careers. For me the need for planning comes here. Nationally we need
to see a wholescale transformation of the delivery of qualiﬁcations from
levels 1 to 5, but especially at levels 2 and 3. The types and range of
qualifcations can be left to the learning market but the delivery 
of certain skills within them need to be managed and planned.
There is no doubting the fact that as Peter Robinson pointed out in
an earlier paper from this series, individuals are becoming very adept
at reading labour market signals about the value of particular types 
of qualiﬁcation and skills. However, individuals still seem to have
signiﬁcant problems in reading into their own abilities and/or
suitability to particular forms of education and indeed work. 
This is particularly relevant to individuals studying at lower 
levels of the education framework. 
The gold standard of A-level is a great example for the learning
market to deal with. Designed in 1951 for the top 3% of the cohort,
the qualiﬁcations are now taken by over 30% of the population in their
final year of full-time study. Far more than 30% expect to take them
during preparation for GCSE and yet each year a huge number of
disappointed 16 year olds, with GCSEs below the magical 4/5 grades
A–C, attempt to plot a course back to their chosen holy grail and on 
to university. Few make it back at the second or even the third attempt.
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at 17 and dramatically for those with poor achievement at GCSE.
Many get lost in GCSE retakes and many more in what 
Michael Young of the Institute of Education, refers to 
as the ‘alphabet soup’ of vocational education.
No-one could argue with the labour market signals that these
qualiﬁcations send out, especially to secondary school pupils in years
10 and 11. It never ceases to amaze me just how many 15 and 16 year olds
expect to pass their GCSEs, take A-levels and go on to university. 
The number is certainly far higher than those who manage to do so.
Equally it never ceases to amaze me how many 17 and 18 year olds
expect to pass their GCSE retakes, take A-levels and go on to university.
No-one is at fault for misreading the signals – not students, teachers,
careers staff or parents – but the simple fact is that A-levels are of no
use whatsoever for vast numbers of pupils who wish to study them.
The learning market is not going to solve this problem as it is certainly
not going to undermine the attraction of these qualiﬁcations in the
labour market. There is an implicit responsibility for a well planned
safety net for those that are suckered into this pathway. This may
manifest itself in a guidance function or on the provision of 
key skills alongside such study – a kind of ‘New Deal’ for 
those who haven’t failed yet but who almost deﬁnitely will.
It is likely that business representation and supply side planning
from LSCs involving them, will beef up the vocational alternatives. 
If the views of the CBI are widely held and exercised then we will see
some clout behind GNVQ and NVQ. In their Qualiﬁed to compete
policy document, they reiterate their support for competences in the
workplace and for competence based educational programmes. 
The original purpose of GNVQs was to provide a preparation for
both continuing education and for employment. But they are at
present serving the needs of education far better than those of
employment. This skewing of the purpose of GNVQs will be
exacerbated still further if their grading – or their name – is altered
to reﬂect more closely that of academic qualiﬁcations such as A-levels.
CBI, 1998
A change in post-16 education is important and an element of planning
and market activity will move the framework closer to the needs of the
UK labour market. By getting employers formally accountable for this
process we may see the educational policy equivalent of Sinn Fein sitting
in the Northern Ireland Assembly. It is hoped that their presence is as
much as a hostage to progress as for diagnosis itself. However, change
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technological revolution, the advent of the ‘knowledge economy’ – but
also simply by the continued failure of so many people in our education
system. It is clear that whatever the ‘new’ economy, is it is increasingly
inaccessible to those people without an appropriate education. 
So how should we respond to this clarion call and speciﬁcally, 
how should we approach the fundamentally crucial 2nd and 3rd levels
of the qualiﬁcations framework?
How can the old and the new educational systems evolve 
together to mutual beneﬁt? The starting point must be a
redeﬁnition of the purpose of education. We must move away
from a view of education as a rite of passage involving the acquisition
of enough knowledge and qualiﬁcations to acquire an adult station
in life. The point of education should not be to inculcate a body
of knowledge, but to develop capabilities: the basic ones of literacy
and numeracy as well as the capability to act responsibly towards
others, to take initiative and to work creatively and collaboratively.
The most important capability, and one which traditional
education is worst at creating, is the ability and yearning 
to carry on learning.
Charles Leadbetter. Living on thin air
Well, he would say that wouldn’t he? – but Leadbetter is probably 
as close to a workable deﬁnition of level 2 and 3 provision as anyone.
The real test is whether a wider agenda of providing generic and key
skills will be the connection to the desired policy of lifelong learning. 
There are also the irresistible calls for widening participation 
and social inclusion through our education system. Clearly, 
most responsibility here will lie with levels 1, 2 and 3. Sanderson 
in Education and economic decline in Britain puts the case most
convincingly as a prerequisite for economic growth and well being 
as opposed to a reach towards Utopian equality:
For the future, in our concern for academic excellence we 
must take much more care not to neglect the non-academic
teenager too easily rejected by the system. Nor should we be 
too beglamoured by the belief that all useless knowledge is mind
trainingly ‘liberal’. Above all we need to see the education of 
the people less as a kind of humane charity and social service 
and recognise it more as fundamental and essential for the
promotion of economic growth.
Michael Sanderson
What do employers want?  111As a ﬁnal conclusion I would say that employers are saying some
things worthy of attention. They are worth repeating in a the new
world of the Learning and Skills Council and they are worth acting on
in terms of appropriately planned provision across all elements of post-
16 education, but especially at levels 2 and 3.
This paper is based on a report carried out by the Employment 
Policy Institute in conjunction with the Edexcel Foundation 
entitled Education at work. A full version of the report will 
be available in April 2000.
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